

Aquisitions and Takeovers

Firms are acquired for a number of reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s, firms such as Gulf & Western and ITT built themselves into conglomerates by acquiring firms in other lines of business. In the 1980s, corporate giants like Time Inc., Beatrice Foods, and RJR Nabisco were acquired by other firms, their own management, or wealthy raiders, who saw potential value in restructuring or breaking up these firms. The 1990s saw a wave of consolidation in the media business as telecommunications firms acquired entertainment firms, and entertainment firms acquired cable businesses. Through time, firms have also acquired or merged with other firms to gain the benefits of synergy, in the form of either higher growth or lower costs.

Acquisitions seem to offer firms a shortcut to their strategic objectives, but the process has its costs. This chapter examines the four basic steps in an acquisition, starting with establishing an acquisition motive, continuing with the identification and valuation of a target firm, and following up with structuring and paying for the deal. The final, and often the most difficult, step is making the acquisition work after the deal is consummated.

BACKGROUND ON ACQUISITIONS

When we talk about acquisitions or takeovers, we are talking about a number of different types of transactions. These transactions can range from one firm merging with another firm to create a new firm to managers of a firm acquiring the firm from its stockholders and creating a private firm. This section begins by looking at the different forms taken by acquisitions, continues by providing an overview on the acquisition process, and concludes by examining the history of the acquisitions in the United States.

Classifying Acquisitions

There are several ways in which a firm can be acquired by another firm. In a merger, the boards of directors of two firms agree to combine and seek stockholder approval for the combination. In most cases, at least 50 percent of the shareholders of the target and the bidding firm have to agree to the merger. The target firm ceases to exist and becomes part of the acquiring firm; Digital Equipment Corporation was absorbed by Compaq after it was acquired in 1997. In a consolidation, a new firm is created after the merger, and both the acquiring firm and target firm stockholders receive stock in this firm; Citigroup, for instance, was the firm created after the consolidation of Citicorp and Travelers' Group.

In a tender offer, one firm offers to buy the outstanding stock of the other firm at a specific price and communicates this offer in advertisements and mailings to stockholders. By doing so, it bypasses the incumbent management and board of directors of the target firm. Consequently, tender offers are used to carry out hostile takeovers. The acquired firm will continue to exist as long as there are minority stockholders who refuse the tender. From a practical standpoint, however, most tender offers eventually become mergers if the acquiring firm is successful in gaining control of the target firm.

In a purchase of assets, one firm acquires the assets of another, though a formal vote by the shareholders of the firm being acquired is still needed.

There is a one final category of acquisitions that does not fit into any of the four described so far. Here, a firm is acquired by its own management or by a group of investors, usually with a tender offer. After this transaction, the acquired firm can cease to exist as a publicly traded firm and become a private business. These acquisitions are called management buyouts if managers are involved, and leveraged buyouts if the funds for the tender offer come predominantly from debt. This was the case, for instance, with the leveraged buyouts of firms such as RJR Nabisco in the 1980s.

Figure 25.1 summarizes the various transactions and the consequences for the target firm.

Process of an Acquisition

Acquisitions can be friendly or hostile events. In a friendly acquisition, the managers of the target firm welcome the acquisition and in some cases seek it out. In a hostile acquisition, the target firm's management does not want to be acquired.




FIGURE 25.1 Classification of Acquisitions

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The acquiring firm offers a price higher than the target firm's market price prior to the acquisition and invites stockholders in the target firm to tender their shares for the price.

In both friendly and hostile acquisitions, the difference between the acquisition price and the market price prior to the acquisition is called the acquisition premium. The acquisition price, in the context of mergers and consolidations, is the price that will be paid by the acquiring firm for each of the target firm's shares. This price is usually based on negotiations between the acquiring firm and the target firm's managers. In a tender offer, it is the price at which the acquiring firm receives enough shares to gain control of the target firm. This price may be higher than the initial price offered by the acquirer, if there are other firms bidding for the same target firm or if an insufficient number of stockholders tender at that initial price. For instance, in 1991 AT&T initially offered to buy NCR for \$80 per share, a premium of \$25 over the stock price at the time of the offer. AT&T ultimately paid \$110 per share to complete the acquisition.

There is one final comparison that can be made, and that is between the price paid on the acquisition and the accounting book value of the equity in the firm being acquired. Depending on how the acquisition is accounted for, this difference will be recorded as goodwill on the acquiring firm's books or not be recorded at all. Figure 25.2 presents the breakdown of the acquisition price into these component parts.




FIGURE 25.2 Breaking Down the Acquisition Price

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE VALUE EFFECTS OF TAKEOVERS

Many researchers have studied the effects of takeovers on the value of both the target firm and the bidder firm. The evidence indicates that the stockholders of target firms are the clear winners in takeovers; they earn significant excess returns¹ not only around the announcement of the acquisitions, but also in the weeks leading up to it. Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed 13 studies that look at returns around takeover announcements and reported an average excess return of 30 percent to target stockholders in successful tender offers and 20 percent to target stockholders in successful mergers. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) reviewed the results of 663 tender offers made between 1962 and 1985 and noted that premiums averaged 19 percent in the 1960s, 35 percent in the 1970s, and 30 percent between 1980 and 1985. Many of the studies report an increase in the stock price of the target firm prior to the takeover announcement, suggesting either a very perceptive financial market or leaked information about prospective deals.

Some attempts at takeovers fail, either because the bidding firm withdraws the offer or because the target firm fights it off. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) analyzed the effects of takeover failures on target firm stockholders and found that, while the initial reaction to the announcement of the failure is negative, albeit statistically insignificant, a substantial number of target firms are taken over within 60 days of the first takeover failing, eventually earning significant excess returns (50 percent to 66 percent).

The effect of takeover announcements on bidder firm stock prices is not as clear-cut. Jensen and Ruback report excess returns of 4 percent for bidding firm stockholders around tender offers and no excess returns around mergers. Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, in their examination of tender offers from 1962 to 1985, note a decline in excess returns to bidding firm stockholders from 4.4 percent in the 1960s to 2 percent in the 1970s to -1 percent in the 1980s. Other studies indicate that approximately half of all bidding firms earn negative excess returns around the announcement of takeovers, suggesting that shareholders are skeptical about the perceived value of the takeover in a significant number of cases.

When an attempt at a takeover fails, Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) report negative excess returns of 5 percent to bidding firm stockholders around the announcement of the failure. When the existence of a rival bidder is figured in, the studies indicate significant negative excess returns (of approximately 8 percent) for bidder firm stockholders who lose out to a rival bidder within 180 trading days of the announcement, and no excess returns when no rival bidder exists.

STEPS IN AN ACQUISITION

There are four basic and not necessarily sequential steps in acquiring a target firm. The first is the development of a rationale and a strategy for doing acquisitions, and what this strategy requires in terms of resources. The second is the

¹Excess returns represent returns over and above the returns you would have expected an investment to make, after adjusting for risk and market performance.

choice of a target for the acquisition and the valuation of the target firm, with premiums for the value of control and any synergy. The third is the determination of how much to pay on the acquisition, how best to raise funds to do it, and whether to use stock or cash. This decision has significant implications for the choice of accounting treatment for the acquisition. The final step in the acquisition, and perhaps the most challenging one, is to make the acquisition work after the deal is complete.

Developing an Acquisition Strategy

Not all firms that make acquisitions have acquisition strategies, and not all firms that have acquisition strategies stick with them. This section considers a number of different motives for acquisitions and suggests that a coherent acquisition strategy has to be based on one or another of these motives.

Acquire Undervalued Firms Firms that are undervalued by financial markets can be targeted for acquisition by those who recognize this mispricing. The acquirer can then gain the difference between the value and the purchase price as surplus. For this strategy to work, however, three basic components need to come together:

1. *A capacity to find firms that trade at less than their true value.* This capacity would require either access to better information than is available to other investors in the market or a better analytical tools than those used by other market participants.
2. *Access to the funds that will be needed to complete the acquisition.* Knowing a firm is undervalued does not necessarily imply having capital easily available to carry out the acquisition. Access to capital depends on the size of the acquirer—large firms will have more access to capital markets and internal funds than smaller firms or individuals—and upon the acquirer's track record—a history of success at identifying and acquiring undervalued firms will make subsequent acquisitions easier.
3. *Skill in execution.* If the acquirer, in the process of the acquisition, drives the stock price up to and beyond the estimated value, there will be no value gained from the acquisition. To illustrate, assume that the estimated value for a firm is \$100 million and that the current market price is \$75 million. In acquiring this firm, the acquirer will have to pay a premium. If that premium exceeds 33 percent of the market price, the price exceeds the estimated value, and the acquisition will not create any value for the acquirer.

While the strategy of buying undervalued firms has a great deal of intuitive appeal, it is daunting, especially when acquiring publicly traded firms in reasonably efficient markets, where the premiums paid on market prices can very quickly eliminate the valuation surplus. The odds are better in less efficient markets or when acquiring private businesses.

Diversify to Reduce Risk A strong argument was made in Chapter 4 that diversification reduces an investor's exposure to firm-specific risk. In fact, the risk and return models used in this book have been built on the presumption that the firm-specific risk will be diversified away and hence will not be rewarded. By buy-

ing firms in ot
they can reduce

Although c
accomplished r
firms diversify
sociated with i
doing the sam
cheaply than fi

There are t
where the own
Here, the argur
posed to all ri:
nesses in Asia
conglomerates.
cumbent mana;
sifying through
investors (who

Create Operati
premiums paid
value from cor
rationale for m

Sources of Ope
firms to increa
synergies can b

1. *Economies*
to become
2. *Greater pr*
which sho
3. *Combinati*
firm with s
4. *Higher gro*
two firms.
emerging 1
name reco

Operating
value of the fir

Sources of Fin
form of either
are the followi

- A combina
portunities
payoff in te
from the p

target firm, with determination to do it, and negotiations for the acquisition work after

and not all firms use a number of acquisition strategy

markets can be the acquirer can as surplus. For e together:

. This capacity ble to other in- d by other mar-

ion. Knowing a sily available to size of the ac- d internal funds : record—a his- will make subse-

tion, drives the no value gained ue for a firm is n acquiring this exceeds 33 per- and the acquisi-

of intuitive ap- s in reasonably ry quickly elim- ets or when ac-

4 that diversifi- the risk and re- ption that the varded. By buy-

ing firms in other businesses and diversifying, acquiring firms' managers believe, they can reduce earnings volatility and risk, and increase potential value.

Although diversification has benefits, it is an open question whether it can be accomplished more efficiently by investors diversifying across traded stocks or by firms diversifying by acquiring other firms. If we compare the transaction costs associated with investor diversification with the costs and the premiums paid by firms doing the same, investors in most publicly traded firms can diversify far more cheaply than firms can.

There are two exceptions to this view. The first is in the case of a private firm, where the owner may have all or most of his or her wealth invested in the firm. Here, the argument for diversification becomes stronger, since the owner alone is exposed to all risk. This risk exposure may explain why many family-owned businesses in Asia, for instance, diversified into multiple businesses and became conglomerates. The second, albeit weaker, case is the closely held firm, whose incumbent managers may have the bulk of their wealth invested in the firm. By diversifying through acquisitions, they reduce their exposure to total risk, though other investors (who presumably are more diversified) may not share their enthusiasm.

Create Operating or Financial Synergy The third reason to explain the significant premiums paid in most acquisitions is synergy. Synergy is the potential additional value from combining two firms. It is probably the most widely used and misused rationale for mergers and acquisitions.

Sources of Operating Synergy Operating synergies are those synergies that allow firms to increase their operating income, increase growth, or do both. Operating synergies can be categorized into four types:

1. *Economies of scale* that may arise from the merger, allowing the combined firm to become more cost-efficient and profitable.
2. *Greater pricing power* from reduced competition and higher market share, which should result in higher margins and operating income.
3. *Combination of different functional strengths*, as would be the case when a firm with strong marketing skills acquires a firm with a good product line.
4. *Higher growth in new or existing markets*, arising from the combination of the two firms. This would be case when a U.S. consumer products firm acquires an emerging market firm, with an established distribution network and brand name recognition, and uses these strengths to increase sales of its products.

Operating synergies can affect margins and growth, and through these the value of the firms involved in the merger or acquisition.

Sources of Financial Synergy With financial synergies, the payoff can take the form of either higher cash flows or a lower cost of capital (discount rate). Included are the following:

- A combination of a firm with excess cash or *cash slack* (and limited project opportunities) and a firm with high-return projects (and limited cash) can yield a payoff in terms of higher value for the combined firm. The increase in value comes from the projects that were taken with the excess cash that otherwise would not

have been taken. This synergy is likely to show up most often when large firms acquire smaller firms, or when publicly traded firms acquire private businesses.

- **Debt capacity** can increase, because when two firms combine, their earnings and cash flows may become more stable and predictable. This, in turn, allows them to borrow more than they could have as individual entities, which creates a tax benefit for the combined firm. This tax benefit can either be shown as higher cash flows or take the form of a lower cost of capital for the combined firm.
- **Tax benefits** can arise either from the acquisition taking advantage of tax laws or from the use of net operating losses to shelter income. Thus, a profitable firm that acquires a money-losing firm may be able to use the net operating losses of the latter to reduce its tax burden. Alternatively, a firm that is able to increase its depreciation charges after an acquisition will save in taxes, and increase its value.

Clearly, there is potential for synergy in many mergers. The more important issues are whether that synergy can be valued and, if so, how to value it.

Empirical Evidence on Synergy Synergy is a stated motive in many mergers and acquisitions. Bhidé (1993) examined the motives behind 77 acquisitions in 1985 and 1986, and reported that operating synergy was the primary motive in one-third of these takeovers. A number of studies examine whether synergy exists and, if it does, how much it is worth. If synergy is perceived to exist in a takeover, the value of the combined firm should be greater than the sum of the values of the bidding and target firms, operating independently.

$$V(AB) > V(A) + V(B)$$

where $V(AB)$ = Value of a firm created by combining A and B (synergy)

$V(A)$ = Value of firm A, operating independently

$V(B)$ = Value of firm B, operating independently

Studies of stock returns around merger announcements generally conclude that the value of the combined firm does increase in most takeovers and that the increase is significant. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) examined a sample of 236 interfirm tender offers between 1963 and 1984 and reported that the combined value of the target and bidder firms increased 7.48 percent (\$117 million in 1984 dollars), on average, on the announcement of the merger. This result has to be interpreted with caution, however, since the increase in the value of the combined firm after a merger is also consistent with a number of other hypotheses explaining acquisitions, including undervaluation and a change in corporate control. It is thus a weak test of the synergy hypothesis.

The existence of synergy generally implies that the combined firm will become more profitable or grow at a faster rate after the merger than will the firms operating separately. A stronger test of synergy is to evaluate whether merged firms improve their performance (profitability and growth) *relative to their competitors*, after takeovers. On this test, as shown later in this chapter, many mergers fail.

Take Over Poorly Managed Firms and Change Management Some firms are not managed optimally, and other individuals often believe they can run them better than the current managers. Acquiring poorly managed firms and removing incumbent

management, make these firms more valuable. This value is created by the acquisition.

Prerequisites for a Successful Acquisition To justify large premerger investments, the following prerequisites must be met:

- The poor performance of the incumbent firm must be clearly identified and quantified.
- The acquisition must be justified by the change in cash flows from the acquisition of the target firm.
- The market must be willing to pay a premium for the acquisition, already having been acquired by another firm.

In the past, the value of a firm acquired in a hostile takeover has been found to be higher than the value of the firm acquired in a friendly takeover.

Empirical Evidence on the Value of a Firm Acquired in a Hostile Takeover The value of a firm acquired in a hostile takeover is generally found to be higher than the value of the firm acquired in a friendly takeover.

- It has undervalued the firm.
- It has been acquired by a firm that is not a competitor.
- It has a high debt-to-equity ratio.

In a comparison of the value of a firm acquired in a hostile takeover with the value of a firm acquired in a friendly takeover, the value of the firm acquired in a hostile takeover is generally found to be higher. This is true for both the value of the firm acquired in a hostile takeover and the value of the firm acquired in a friendly takeover.

1. Many of the firms acquired in a hostile takeover are acquired from firms that are not competitors.
2. There was a high debt-to-equity ratio for the firms acquired in a hostile takeover.
3. Almost 60 percent of the firms acquired in a hostile takeover are acquired from firms that are not competitors.

large firms ac-
businesses.
earnings and
allows them
creates a tax
own as higher
joined firm.
of tax laws or
profitable firm
ating losses of
to increase its
ease its value.

important is-
t.

mergers and
tions in 1985
e in one-third
xists and, if it
over, the value
of the bidding

y)

conclude that
d that the in-
ple of 236 in-
mbined value
in 1984 dol-
as to be inter-
mbined firm
explaining ac-
ol. It is thus a

n will become
firms operat-
ged firms im-
competitors,
rgers fail.

s are not man-
m better than
ng incumbent

management, or at least changing existing management policy or practices, should make these firms more valuable, allowing the acquirer to claim the increase in value. This value increase is often termed the value of control.

Prerequisites for Success While this corporate control story can be used to justify large premiums over the market price, the potential for its success rests on the following:

- The poor performance of the firm being acquired should be attributable to the incumbent management of the firm, rather than to market or industry factors that are not under management control.
- The acquisition has to be followed by a change in management practices, and the change has to increase value. Actions that enhance value increase cash flows from existing assets, increase expected growth rates, increase the length of the growth period, or reduce the cost of capital.
- The market price of the acquisition should reflect the status quo—the current management of the firm and their poor business practices. If the market price already has the control premium built into it, there is little potential for the acquirer to earn the premium.

In the past two decades, corporate control has been increasingly cited as a reason for hostile acquisitions.

Empirical Evidence on the Value of Control The strongest support for the existence of a market for corporate control lies in the types of firms that are typically acquired in hostile takeovers. Research indicates that the typical target firm in a hostile takeover has the following characteristics:

- It has underperformed other stocks in its industry and the overall market, in terms of returns to its stockholders in the years preceding the takeover.
- It has been less profitable than firms in its industry in the years preceding the takeover.
- It has a much lower stock holding by insiders than do firms in its peer groups.

In a comparison of target firms in hostile and friendly takeovers, Bhidé illustrates their differences. His findings are summarized in Figure 25.3. As you can see, target firms in hostile takeovers have earned a 2.2 percent lower return on equity, on average, than other firms in their industry; they have earned returns for their stockholders that are 4 percent lower than the market; and only 6.5% of their stock is held by insiders.

There is also evidence that firms make significant changes in the way they operate after hostile takeovers. In his study, Bhidé examined the aftermaths of hostile takeovers and noted the following four changes:

1. Many of the hostile takeovers were followed by an increase in debt, which resulted in a downgrading of the debt. The debt was quickly reduced with proceeds from the sale of assets, however.
2. There was no significant change in the amount of capital investment in these firms.
3. Almost 60 percent of the takeovers were followed by significant divestitures, in




FIGURE 25.3 Target Characteristics—Hostile versus Friendly Takeover
Source: Bhidé.

which half or more of the firm was divested. The overwhelming majority of the divestitures were units in business areas unrelated to the company's core business (i.e., they constituted reversal of corporate diversification done in earlier time periods).

4. There were significant management changes in 17 of the 19 hostile takeovers, with the replacement of the entire corporate management team in seven of the takeovers.

Thus, contrary to popular view,² most hostile takeovers are not followed by the acquirer stripping the assets of the target firm and leading it to ruin. Instead, target firms refocus on their core businesses and often improve their operating performance.

Cater to Managerial Self-Interest In most acquisitions, it is the managers of the acquiring firm who decide whether to carry out the acquisition and how much to pay for it, rather than the stockholders of the same firm. Given these circumstances, the motive for some acquisitions may not be stockholder wealth maximization, but rather managerial self-interest, manifested in any of the following motives for acquisitions:

- **Empire building.** Some top managers' interests seem to lie in making their firms the largest and most dominant firms in their industry or even in the entire market. This objective, rather than diversification, may explain the acquisition strategies of firms like Gulf & Western and ITT³ in the 1960s and 1970s. Note that both firms had strong-willed CEOs (Charles Bludhorn in the case of Gulf

²Even if it is not the popular view, it is the populist view that has found credence in Hollywood, in movies like *Wall Street* and *Other People's Money*, and in books such as *Barbarians at the Gate*.

³In a delicious irony, ITT itself became the target of a hostile acquisition bid by Hilton Hotels and responded by shedding what it termed its noncore businesses (i.e., all the businesses it had acquired during its conglomerate period.).

If manager
sitions, sh
In a sense,
on capital
we assume
the future.

By the
tion when
the same
firm's futu
return on

& Weste
periods.

- **Manager**
multiple
agers in
might co
- **Compen**
result in
private g
them to t

In a 198
be understir
explained by

Choosing a T

Once a firm
answered. Th
quisition, giv
more concret
tives that we


Choosing a Y

program, it h

- If the mc
valued. E

'An interesting
women: rise to
winning and lo

it of Stock
y Insiders



ajority of the
y's core busi-
one in earlier

le takeovers,
seven of the

ed by the ac-
instead, target
performance.

ers of the ac-
ch to pay for
ices, the mo-
n, but rather
quisitions:

g their firms
entire mar-
acquisition
1970s. Note
case of Gulf

nce in Holly-
ch as Barbar-

y Hilton Ho-
he businesses

SHOULD THERE BE AN EGO DISCOUNT?

If managerial self-interest and egos can cause firms to pay too much on acquisitions, should the values of firms run by strong-willed CEOs be discounted? In a sense, this discount is probably already applied if the firm's current return on capital and reinvestment rate reflect the failed acquisitions of the past, and we assume that the firm will continue to generate the same return on capital in the future.

By the same token, though, this is a good reason to revisit a firm valuation when there is a change at the top. If the new CEO does not seem to have the same desire to empire-build or overpay on acquisitions as the old one, the firm's future return on capital can be expected to be much higher than its past return on capital, and its value will rise.

& Western and Harold Geneen in the case of the ITT) during their acquisitive periods.

- *Managerial ego.* It is clear that some acquisitions, especially when there are multiple bidders for the same firm, become tests of machismo⁴ for the managers involved. Neither side wants to lose the battle, even though winning might cost their stockholders billions of dollars.
- *Compensation and side benefits.* In some cases, mergers and acquisitions can result in the rewriting of management compensation contracts. If the potential private gains to the managers from the transaction are large, it might blind them to the costs created for their own stockholders.

In a 1981 paper titled "The Hubris Hypothesis," Roll suggested that we might be underestimating how much of the acquisition process and the prices paid can be explained by managerial pride and ego.

Choosing a Target Firm and Valuing Control/Synergy

Once a firm has an acquisition motive, there are two key questions that need to be answered. The first relates to how to best identify a potential target firm for an acquisition, given the motives described in the previous section. The second is the more concrete question of how to value a target firm, again given the different motives that we have outlined in the last section.

Choosing a Target Firm Once a firm has identified the reason for its acquisition program, it has to find the appropriate target firm.

- If the motive for acquisitions is undervaluation, the target firm must be undervalued. How such a firm will be identified depends on the valuation approach

⁴An interesting question that is whether these bidding wars will become less likely as more women rise to become CEOs of firms. They might bring in a different perspective on what winning and losing in a merger means.

and model used. With relative valuation, an undervalued stock is one that trades at a multiple (of earnings, book value, or sales) well below that of the rest of the industry, after controlling for significant differences on fundamentals. Thus a bank with a price-to-book value ratio of 1.2 would be an undervalued bank if other banks have similar fundamentals (return on equity, growth, and risk) but trade at much higher price-to-book value ratios. In discounted cash flow valuation approaches, an undervalued stock is one that trades at a price well below the estimated discounted cash flow value.

- If the motive for acquisitions is diversification, the most likely target firms will be in businesses that are unrelated to and uncorrelated with the business of the acquiring firm. Thus, a cyclical firm should try to acquire countercyclical or at least noncyclical firms to get the fullest benefit from diversification.
- If the motive for acquisitions is operating synergy, the typical target firm will vary depending on the source of the synergy. For economies of scale, the target firm should be in the same business as the acquiring firm. Thus, the acquisition of Security Pacific by Bank of America was motivated by potential cost savings from economies of scale. For functional synergy, the target firm should be strongest in those functional areas where the acquiring firm is weak. For financial synergy, the target firm will be chosen to reflect the likely source of the synergy—a risky firm with limited or no standalone capacity for borrowing, if the motive is increased debt capacity, or a firm with significant net operating losses carried forward, if the motive is tax benefits.
- If the motive for the merger is control, the target firm will be a poorly managed firm in an industry where there is potential for excess returns. In addition, its stock holdings will be widely dispersed (making it easier to carry out the hostile acquisition) and the current market price will be based on the presumption that incumbent management will continue to run the firm.
- If the motive is managerial self-interest, the choice of a target firm will reflect managerial interests rather than economic reasons.

Table 25.1 summarizes the typical target firm, given the motive for the takeover.

TABLE 25.1 Target Firm Characteristics Given Acquisition Motive

If Motive Is	Then the Target Firm
Undervaluation	Trades at a price below the estimated value.
Diversification	Is in a business different from the acquiring firm's business.
Operating synergy	Has the characteristics that create the operating synergy. <i>Cost savings:</i> In same business to create economies of scale. <i>Higher growth:</i> Has potential to open up new markets or expand existing ones.
Financial synergy	Has the characteristics that create financial synergy. <i>Tax savings:</i> Provides a tax benefit to acquirer. <i>Debt capacity:</i> Is unable to borrow money or pay high interest rates. <i>Cash slack:</i> Has great projects/no funds.
Control	Is a badly managed firm whose stock has underperformed the market.
Manager's interests	Has characteristics that best meet CEO's ego and power needs.

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

There are
The first is th:
multaneously,
these sections
acquisition—
should be gui

Valuing the Tai
ferent from th
premiums int
relationship b
steps, starting
value for cont

Status Quo V
value with exi
the status quo
can be estimai
tion continue
flows from ex
growth period

ILLUSTRATION :

In 1997, Digital I
quisition bid by
world. The acqui
that Compaq wo
ergies in the for
selling to Digital'
To analyze
quisition, Digital

- Digital f
into a pi
on capit
- Based o
mately
the time

- Digital f
ing capi
- Operati
for the r
- After ye
year 5.

⁵The reinvestment
tal investment pus

ck is one that
ow that of the
on fundamen-
be an under-
rn on equity,
ratios. In dis-
k is one that
lue.

get firms will
usiness of the
rcyclical or at
1.

firm will vary
ne target firm
isition of Se-
savings from
e strongest in
cial synergy,
ergy—a risky
motive is in-
s carried for-

arly managed
addition, its
at the hostile
umption that

will reflect

takeover.

s.

e.
expand

rest rates.

the market.
eds.

Damodaran,
ion of John

There are two final points worth making here before moving on to valuation. The first is that firms often choose a target firm and a motive for the acquisition simultaneously, rather than sequentially. That does not change any of the analysis in these sections. The other point is that firms often have more than one motive in an acquisition—say, control and synergy. If this is the case, the search for a target firm should be guided by the dominant motive.

Valuing the Target Firm The valuation of an acquisition is not fundamentally different from the valuation of any firm, although the existence of control and synergy premiums introduces some complexity into the valuation process. Given the interrelationship between synergy and control, the safest way to value a target firm is in steps, starting with a status quo valuation of the firm, and following up with a value for control and a value for synergy.

Status Quo Valuation The valuation of the target firm starts by estimating the firm value with existing investing, financing, and dividend policies. This valuation, termed the status quo valuation, provides a base from which control and synergy premiums can be estimated. All of the basic principles presented in the earlier chapters on valuation continue to apply here. In particular, the value of the firm is a function of its cash flows from existing assets, the expected growth in these cash flows during a high-growth period, the length of the high-growth period, and the firm's cost of capital.

ILLUSTRATION 25.1: A Status Quo Valuation of Digital Equipment Corporation

In 1997, Digital Equipment, a leading manufacturer of mainframe computers, was the target of an acquisition bid by Compaq, which was at that time the leading personal computer manufacturer in the world. The acquisition was partly motivated by the belief that Digital was a poorly managed firm and that Compaq would be a much better manager of Digital's assets. In addition, Compaq expected synergies in the form of both cost savings (from economies of scale) and higher growth (from Compaq selling to Digital's customers).

To analyze the acquisition, we begin with a status quo valuation of Digital. At the time of the acquisition, Digital had the following characteristics:

- Digital had earnings before interest and taxes of \$391.38 million in 1997, which translated into a pretax operating margin of 3% on revenues of \$13,046 million and an after-tax return on capital of 8.51%; the firm had a tax rate of 36%.
- Based on its beta of 1.15, an after-tax cost of borrowing of 5%, and a debt ratio of approximately 10%, the cost of capital for Digital in 1997 was 11.59%. (The Treasury bond rate at the time of the analysis was 6% and we used a risk premium of 5.5%.)

$$\text{Cost of equity} = 6\% + 1.15(5.5\%) = 12.33\%$$

$$\text{Cost of capital} = 12.33\%(.9) + 5\%(.1) = 11.59\%$$

- Digital had capital expenditures of \$475 million⁵ and depreciation of \$461 million, and working capital is 15% of revenues.
- Operating income, net capital expenditures, and revenues were expected to grow 6% a year for the next five years.
- After year 5, operating income and revenues were expected to grow 5% a year forever. After year 5, capital expenditures were expected to be 110% of depreciation, with depreciation

⁵The reinvestment rate is therefore low when we look at net capital expenditures. However, the large working capital investment pushes it up.

growing at 5%. The debt ratio remained at 10%, but the after-tax cost of debt dropped to 4% and the beta dropped to 1.

The value of Digital, based on these inputs, was estimated to be \$2,110.41 million.

Year	EBIT(1 - t)	Net Cap Ex	Change in WC	FCFF ⁶	Terminal Value	PV
1	\$265.51	\$14.84	\$117.41	\$133.26		\$ 119.42
2	\$281.44	\$15.73	\$124.46	\$141.25		\$ 113.43
3	\$298.33	\$16.67	\$131.93	\$149.73		\$ 107.75
4	\$316.23	\$17.67	\$139.84	\$158.71		\$ 102.35
5	\$335.20	\$18.74	\$148.23	\$168.24	\$2,717.35	\$1,667.47
Terminal year	\$351.96	\$64.78	\$130.94	\$156.25		
Firm value						\$2,110.41

Note that the terminal value is computed using the free cash flow to the firm in year 6 and the new cost of capital after year 5:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{New cost of equity after year 5} &= 6\% + 1.00(5.5\%) = 11.5\% \\ \text{New cost of capital after year 5} &= 11.50\%(.9) + 4\%(.1) = 10.75\% \\ \text{Terminal value} &= \$156.25 / (.1075 - .05) = \$2,717.35\end{aligned}$$

Value of Corporate Control Many hostile takeovers are justified on the basis of the existence of a market for corporate control. Investors and firms are willing to pay large premiums over the market price to control the management of firms, especially those that they perceive to be poorly run. This section explores the determinants of the value of corporate control and attempts to value it in the context of an acquisition.

Determinants of the Value of Corporate Control The value of wresting control of a firm from incumbent management is inversely proportional to the perceived quality of that management and its capacity to maximize firm value. In general, the value of control will be much greater for a poorly managed firm that operates at below optimum capacity than for a well-managed firm.

The value of controlling a firm comes from changes made to existing management policy that can increase the firm value. Assets can be acquired or liquidated, the financing mix can be changed and the dividend policy reevaluated, and the firm can be restructured to maximize value. If we can identify the changes that we would make to the target firm, we can value control. The value of control can then be written as:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Value of control} &= \text{Value of firm optimally managed} \\ &\quad - \text{Value of firm with current management}\end{aligned}$$

The value of control is negligible for firms that are operating at or close to their optimal value, since a restructuring will yield little additional value. It can be substantial for firms operating at well below optimal, since a restructuring can lead to a significant increase in value.

⁶To estimate FCFF in year 1,

$$\begin{aligned}\text{FCFF}_1 &= \text{EBIT}(1 - t)(1 + g) - \text{Net cap ex}(1 + g) - \text{Revenue}(g)(\text{WC as \% of revenues}) \\ &= \$391.38(1 - .36)(1.06) - (475 - 461)(1.06) - \$13,046(.06)(.15) = \$133.26 \text{ million}\end{aligned}$$

ILLUSTRATION

We said earlier that Digital was a poorly managed firm. By making the

■ Digital capital

■ Digital margin

■ The return to capital

■ After the restructuring

The effect of the restructuring

Year

1
2
3
4
5

Terminal year
Firm value

The lower cost of capital of \$2,110.41 million

Valuing Operations One of the other arguments for synergy can be made. It argues that a firm can do so require not be willing to pay for it. While value and growth, unbiased estimates of the two

1. What factors affect the value of sales

f debt dropped to 4%

	PV
	\$ 119.42
	\$ 113.43
	\$ 107.75
	\$ 102.35
17.35	\$1,667.47
	\$2,110.41

year 6 and the new

35

on the basis of the
re willing to pay
f firms, especially
terminants of the
in acquisition.

esting control of
e perceived qual-
. In general, the
it operates at be-

ing management
iquidated, the fi-
d the firm can be
e would make to
e written as;

nent

or close to their
e. It can be sub-
ring can lead to

of revenues)
= \$133.26 million

ILLUSTRATION 25.2: The Value of Control at Digital

We said earlier that one of the reasons Digital was targeted by Compaq was that it was viewed as poorly managed. Assuming that Compaq was correct in its perceptions, we valued control at Digital by making the following assumptions:

- Digital will raise its debt ratio to its optimal of 20%. The beta will increase, but the cost of capital will decrease.
 New beta = 1.25 (Unlevered beta = 1.07; Debt/equity ratio = 25%)
 Cost of equity = $6\% + 1.25(5.5\%) = 12.88\%$
 New after-tax cost of debt = 5.25%; the firm is riskier, and its default risk will increase
 Cost of capital = $12.88\%(0.8) + 5.25\%(0.2) = 11.35\%$
- Digital will raise its return on capital to 11.35%, which is its cost of capital. (Pretax operating margin will go up to 4%, which is close to the industry average.)
- The reinvestment rate remains unchanged, but the increase in the return on capital will increase the expected growth rate in the next five years to 10%.
- After year 5, the beta will drop to 1, and the after-tax cost of debt will decline to 4%, as in the previous example. The cost of capital will drop to 10% as a consequence.

The effect of these assumptions on the cash flows and present values is listed in the following table:

Year	EBIT(1 - t)	Net Cap Ex	Change in WC	FCFF	Terminal Value	PV
1	\$367.38	\$15.40	\$195.69	\$156.29		\$ 140.36
2	\$404.11	\$16.94	\$215.26	\$171.91		\$ 138.65
3	\$444.52	\$18.63	\$236.78	\$189.11		\$ 136.97
4	\$488.98	\$20.50	\$260.46	\$208.02		\$ 135.31
5	\$537.87	\$22.55	\$286.51	\$228.82	\$6,584.62	\$3,980.29
Terminal year	\$564.77	\$77.96	\$157.58	\$329.23		
Firm value						\$4,531.59

The lower cost of capital and higher growth rate increase the firm value from the status quo valuation of \$2,110.41 million to \$4,531.59 million. We can then estimate the value of control:

Value of firm (optimally managed)	\$4,531.59 million
Value of firm (status quo)	\$2,110.41 million
Value of control	\$2,421.18 million

Valuing Operating Synergy There is a potential for operating synergy, in one form or the other, in many takeovers. Some disagreement exists, however, over whether synergy can be valued and, if so, what that value should be. One school of thought argues that synergy is too nebulous to be valued and that any systematic attempt to do so requires so many assumptions that it is pointless. If this is true, a firm should not be willing to pay large premiums for synergy it cannot attach a value to.

While valuing synergy requires us to make assumptions about future cash flows and growth, the lack of precision in the process does not mean we cannot obtain an unbiased estimate of value. Thus we maintain that synergy can be valued by answering two fundamental questions:

1. *What form is the synergy expected to take?* Will it reduce costs as a percentage of sales and increase profit margins (e.g., when there are economies of scale)?

Will it increase future growth (e.g., when there is increased market power) or the length of the growth period? Synergy, to have an effect on value, has to influence one of the four inputs into the valuation process—cash flows from existing assets, higher expected growth rates (market power, higher growth potential), a longer growth period (from increased competitive advantages), or a lower cost of capital (higher debt capacity).

2. *When will the synergy start affecting cash flows?* Synergies can sometimes show up instantaneously, but they are more likely to show up over time. Since the value of synergy is the present value of the cash flows created by it, the longer it takes for it to show up, the smaller its value.

Once we answer these questions, we can estimate the value of synergy using an extension of discounted cash flow techniques. First, we value the firms involved in the merger independently, by discounting expected cash flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm. Second, we estimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, by adding the values obtained for each firm in the first step. Third, we build in the effects of synergy into expected growth rates and cash flows, and we value the combined firm with synergy. The difference between the value of the combined firm with synergy and the value of the combined firm without synergy provides a value for synergy.

Figure 25.4 summarizes the effects of synergy and control in valuing a target firm for an acquisition. Notice the difference between Figure 25.2, which is based on the market price of the target firm before and after the acquisition, and Figure 25.4, where

Component	Valuation Guidelines	Should You Pay?
Synergy	Value the combined firm with synergy built in. This value may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A higher growth rate in revenues: <i>growth synergy</i>.• Higher margins because of <i>economies of scale</i>.• Lower taxes because of tax benefits: <i>tax synergy</i>.• Lower cost of debt: <i>financing synergy</i>.• Higher debt ratio because of lower risk: <i>debt capacity</i>. Subtract the value of the target firm (with control premium) + value of the bidding firm (preacquisition). This is the value of synergy.	<i>Which firm is indispensable for synergy?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• If it is the target, you should be willing to pay up to the value of synergy.• If it is the bidder, you should not.
Control Premium	Value the company as if optimally managed. This will usually mean altering investment, financing, and dividend policy: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><i>Investment policy:</i> Earn higher returns on projects and divest unproductive projects.<i>Financing policy:</i> Move to a better financing structure (e.g., optimal capital structure).<i>Dividend policy:</i> Return cash for which the firm has no need. Practically, <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Look at industry averages as optimal.• Do a full-fledged corporate financial analysis to compute optimal debt ratio.	If motive is control or in a standalone valuation, this is the maximum you should pay.
Status Quo Valuation	Value the company as is, with existing inputs for investment, financing, and dividend policy.	If motive is undervaluation, the status quo value is the maximum you should pay.

FIGURE 25.4 Valuing an Acquisition

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

we are lookin
trol and syne
better nor we
consolidated

ILLUSTRATION

Returning to th
quisition. To va
following assur

- Compa
million
- The fir
most r
- The fin
- The op
year fo
- After y
capital
its deb

Based on these

Year
1
2
3
4
5
Terminal year
Firm value
The value of Co
The value
values of the fi
value of Digital
arrive at the val

This would be t
To value th
affect cash flow

- The co
ter-tax
lion. TI
Ci

ket power) or
lue, has to in-
ows from ex-
higher growth
lvantages), or

an sometimes
er time. Since
ted by it, the

ergy using an
is involved in
h firm at the
e value of the
ch firm in the
wth rates and
ence between
combined firm

g a target firm
based on the
e 25.4, where

You Pay?

pensable for

you should be
to the value of

you should not.

or in a standalone
e
uld pay.

aluation, the status
imum you should

1 Damodaran,
ission of John

we are looking at the value of the target firm with and without the premiums for control and synergy. A fair-value acquisition, which would leave the acquiring firm neither better nor worse off, would require that the total price (in Figure 25.2) be equal to the consolidated value (in Figure 25.4) with the synergy and control benefits built in.

ILLUSTRATION 25.3: Valuing Synergy: Compaq and Digital

Returning to the Compaq/Digital merger, note that synergy was one of the stated reasons for the acquisition. To value this synergy, we needed to first value Compaq as a standalone firm. To do this, the following assumptions were made:

- Compaq had earnings before interest and taxes of \$2,987 million on revenues of \$25,484 million. The tax rate for the firm is 36%.
- The firm had capital expenditures of \$729 million and depreciation of \$545 million in the most recent year; working capital is 15% of revenues.
- The firm had a debt-to-capital ratio of 10%, a beta of 1.25, and an after-tax cost of debt of 5%.
- The operating income, revenues, and net capital expenditures are all expected to grow 10% a year for the next five years.
- After year 5, operating income and revenues are expected to grow 5% a year forever, and capital expenditures are expected to be 110% of depreciation. In addition, the firm will raise its debt ratio to 20%, the after-tax cost of debt will drop to 4%, and the beta will drop to 1.00.

Based on these inputs, the value of the firm can be estimated as follows:

Year	EBIT(1 - t)	Net Cap Ex	Change in WC	FCFF	Terminal Value	PV
1	\$2,102.85	\$202.40	\$382.26	\$1,518.19		\$ 1,354.47
2	\$2,313.13	\$222.64	\$420.49	\$1,670.01		\$ 1,329.24
3	\$2,544.45	\$244.90	\$462.53	\$1,837.01		\$ 1,304.49
4	\$2,798.89	\$269.39	\$508.79	\$2,020.71		\$ 1,280.19
5	\$3,078.78	\$296.33	\$559.67	\$2,222.78	\$56,654.81	\$33,278.53
Terminal year	\$3,232.72	\$ 92.16	\$307.82	\$2,832.74		
Firm value						\$38,546.91

The value of Compaq is \$38.547 billion.

The value of the combined firm (Compaq and Digital), with no synergy, should be the sum of the values of the firms valued independently. To avoid double counting the value of control, we add the value of Digital, optimally managed, that was estimated in Illustration 25.2, to the value of Compaq to arrive at the value of the combined firm:

Value of Digital (optimally managed)	\$4,531.59 million
Value of Compaq (status quo)	\$38,546.91 million
Value of combined firm	\$43,078.50 million

This would be the value of the combined firm in the absence of synergy.

To value the synergy, we made the following assumptions about the way in which synergy would affect cash flows and discount rates at the combined firm:

- The combined firm will have some economies of scale, allowing it to increase its current after-tax operating margin slightly. The annual dollar savings will be approximately \$100 million. This will translate into a slightly higher pretax operating margin:

$$\text{Current operating margin} = (\text{EBIT}_{\text{Compaq}} + \text{EBIT}_{\text{Digital}}) / (\text{Sales}_{\text{Compaq}} + \text{Sales}_{\text{Digital}}) \\ = (2,987 + 522) / (25,484 + 13,046) = 9.11\%$$

$$\text{New operating margin} = (2,987 + 522 + 100) / (25,484 + 13,046) = 9.36\%$$

- The combined firm will also have a slightly higher growth rate of 10.50% in revenues, operating income, and net cap ex over the next five years because of operating synergies.
- The beta of the combined firm was computed in three steps. We first estimated the unlevered betas for Digital and Compaq:

Digital's unlevered beta = $1.25/[1 + (1 - .36)(.25)] = 1.07$

Compaq's unlevered beta = $1.25/[1 + (1 - .36)(.10/.90)] = 1.17$

We then weighted these unlevered betas by the values of these firms to estimate an unlevered beta for the combined firm; Digital has a firm value of \$4.5 billion, and Compaq's firm value was \$38.6 billion.⁷

Unlevered beta for combined firm = $1.07 \times (4.5/43.1) + 1.17(38.6/43.1) = 1.16$

We then used the debt-to-equity ratio for the combined firm to estimate a new levered beta and cost of capital for the firm. The debt-to-equity ratio for the combined firm, estimated by cumulating the outstanding debt and market value of equity at the two firms, is 13.64%:

New levered beta = $1.16[1 + (1 - 0.36)(.1364)] = 1.26$

Cost of capital = $12.93\%(.88) + 5\%(.12) = 11.98\%$

Based on these assumptions, the cash flows and value of the combined firm, with synergy, can be estimated:

Year	EBIT(1 - t)	Net Cap Ex	Change in WC	FCFF	Terminal Value	PV
1	\$2,552.28	\$218.79	\$606.85	\$1,726.65		\$ 1,541.95
2	\$2,820.27	\$241.76	\$670.57	\$1,907.95		\$ 1,521.59
3	\$3,116.40	\$267.15	\$740.98	\$2,108.28		\$ 1,501.50
4	\$3,443.63	\$295.20	\$818.78	\$2,329.65		\$ 1,481.68
5	\$3,805.21	\$326.19	\$904.75	\$2,574.26	\$66,907.52	\$39,463.87
Terminal year	\$3,995.47	\$174.02	\$476.07	\$3,345.38		
Firm value						\$45,510.58

The value of the combined firm, with synergy, is \$45,510.58 million. This can be compared to the value of the combined firm without synergy of \$43,078.50 million, and the difference is the value of the synergy in the merger.

Value of combined firm (with synergy)	\$45,510.58 million
Value of combined firm (with no synergy)	\$43,078.50 million
Value of synergy	\$2,422.08 million

This valuation is based on the presumption that synergy will be created instantaneously. In reality, it can take years before the firms are able to see the benefits of synergy. A simple way to account for the delay is to consider the present value of synergy. Thus, if it will take Compaq and Digital three years to create the synergy, the present value of synergy can be estimated, using the combined firm's cost of capital as the discount rate:

Present value of synergy = $\$2,422 \text{ million}/(1.1198)^3 = \$1,724.86 \text{ million}$



synergy.xls: This spreadsheet allows you to estimate the approximate value of synergy in a merger or acquisition.

⁷The values that we used were the values that we estimated for the two firms.

Valuing F
tors. We
excess cas
ductions,
begins, ho
mergers is

Diversific
effect on t
firms are
their own
parts man
is an autc
for the div

Curre
Expec
Expec
Debt/
After-
Beta
Beta

The treas
calculatio
shown in

TABLE 25.1

Debt (%)
Cost of de
Equity (%)
Cost of eq
Cost of cap
Cost of cap
Cost of cap
Cost of cap
Cost of cap
Cost of cap
FCFF in ye
FCFF in ye
FCFF in ye
FCFF in ye
FCFF in ye
Terminal v
Present val

Source: Co
copyright
Wiley & S

revenues, operat-
nergies.
ted the unlevered

Unlevered beta for
was \$38.6 billion.⁷

= 1.16

red beta and cost
y cumulating the

synergy, can be

al/
PV

\$ 1,541.95
\$ 1,521.59
\$ 1,501.50
\$ 1,481.68
52 \$39,463.87

\$45,510.58

compared to the
ce is the value of

usly. In reality, it
o account for the
ital three years to
ed firm's cost of

on

lue of

Valuing Financial Synergy Synergy can also be created from purely financial factors. We will consider three legitimate sources of financial synergy: better use for excess cash or cash slack, a greater tax benefit from accumulated losses or tax deductions, and an increase in debt capacity and therefore firm value. The discussion begins, however, with diversification, which though a widely used rationale for mergers is not a source of increased value by itself.

Diversification A takeover motivated only by diversification considerations has no effect on the combined value of the two firms involved in the takeover when the two firms are both publicly traded and when the investors in the firms can diversify on their own. Consider the following example. Dalton Motors, which is an automobile parts manufacturing firm in a cyclical business, plans to acquire Lube & Auto, which is an automobile service firm whose business is noncyclical and high-growth, solely for the diversification benefit. The characteristics of the two firms are as follows:

	<i>Lube & Auto</i>	<i>Dalton Motors</i>
Current free cash flow to the firm	\$100 million	\$200 million
Expected growth rate—next five years	20%	10%
Expected growth rate—after year 5	6%	6%
Debt/(Debt + Equity)	30%	30%
After-tax cost of debt	6%	5.40%
Beta for equity—next five years	1.20	1.00
Beta for equity—after year 5	1.00	1.00

The treasury bond rate is 7 percent, and the market premium is 5.5 percent. The calculations for the weighted average cost of capital and the value of the firms are shown in Table 25.2:

TABLE 25.2 Value of Lube & Auto, Dalton Motors, and Combined Firm

	<i>Lube & Auto</i>	<i>Dalton Motors</i>	<i>Combined Firm</i>
Debt (%)	30%	30%	30%
Cost of debt	6.00%	5.40%	5.65%
Equity (%)	70%	70%	70%
Cost of equity	13.60%	12.50%	12.95%
Cost of capital—year 1	11.32%	10.37%	10.76%
Cost of capital—year 2	11.32%	10.37%	10.76%
Cost of capital—year 3	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%
Cost of capital—year 4	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%
Cost of capital—year 5	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%
Cost of capital after	10.55%	10.37%	10.45%
FCFF in year 1	\$ 120.00	\$ 220.00	\$ 340.00
FCFF in year 2	\$ 144.00	\$ 242.00	\$ 386.00
FCFF in year 3	\$ 172.80	\$ 266.20	\$ 439.00
FCFF in year 4	\$ 207.36	\$ 292.82	\$ 500.18
FCFF in year 5	\$ 248.83	\$ 322.10	\$ 570.93
Terminal value	\$5,796.97	\$7,813.00	\$13,609.97
Present value	\$4,020.91	\$5,760.47	\$ 9,781.38

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The cost of equity and debt for the combined firm is obtained by taking the weighted average of the individual firm's costs of equity (debt); the weights are based on the relative market values of equity (debt) of the two firms. Since these relative market values change over time, the costs of equity and debt for the combined firm also change over time. The value of the combined firm is exactly the same as the sum of the values of the independent firms, indicating that there is no value gain from diversification.

This equality does not imply, however, that the shareholders in the bidding and target firms are indifferent about such takeovers, since the bidding firm pays a significant premium over the market price. To the extent that these firms were correctly valued before the merger (market value of Lube & Auto = \$4,020.91; market value of Dalton Motors = \$5,760.47), the payment of a premium over the market price will transfer wealth from the bidding firm to the target firm.

The absence of added value from this merger may seem puzzling, given the fact that the two firms are in unrelated businesses and thus should gain some diversification benefit. In fact, if the earnings of the two firms are not highly correlated, the variance in earnings of the combined firm should be significantly lower than the variance in earnings of the individual firms operating independently. This reduction in earnings variance does not affect value, however, because it is firm-specific risk, which is assumed to have no effect on expected returns. (The betas, which are measures of market risk, are always value-weighted averages of the betas of the two merging firms.) But what about the impact of reduced variance on debt capacity? Firms with lower variability in earnings can increase debt capacity and thus value. This can be a real benefit of conglomerate mergers, and will be considered separately later in this section.

Cash Slack Managers may reject profitable investment opportunities if they have to raise new capital to finance them. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that since managers have more information than investors about prospective projects, new stock may have to be issued at less than true value to finance these projects, leading to the rejection of good projects and to capital rationing for some firms. It may therefore make sense for a company with excess cash and no investment opportunities to take over a cash-poor firm with good investment opportunities, or vice versa. The additional value of combining these two firms is the present value of the projects that would not have been taken if they had stayed apart, but can now be taken because of the availability of cash.

Cash slack can be a potent rationale for publicly traded firms that have ready access to capital and want to acquire small, private firms that have capital constraints. It may also explain why acquisition strategies concentrating on buying smaller, private firms have worked fairly well in practice. Blockbuster Inc. (video rental), Browning and Ferris (waste disposal), and Service Merchandise (funeral homes) are good examples.

Tax Benefits Several possible tax benefits accrue from takeovers. If one of the firms has tax deductions that it cannot use because it is losing money, whereas the other firm has income on which it pays significant taxes, combining the two firms can result in tax benefits that can be shared by the two firms. The value of this synergy is the present value of the tax savings that result from this merger. In addition, the assets of the firm being taken over can be written up to reflect new market values in some forms of mergers, leading to higher tax savings from depreciation in future years.

ILLUSTRATION

One of the early
sified firm in
bought out the
ties was a maj
\$400 million—
claim depreciat
effect of this de
ital of 14.5%, &

Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1980–1989

Note that the i
higher asset v
schedules con
based amounts
In recent
acquiring firms
value.

Debt Capac
perfectly cor
the cash flo
increase in
ever, has to
holders in b
The bondho
the takeover
firms, howe
price, increa
There a
tios as a co
duced defau
individual fi
the merger,
value of the

by taking the
ne weights are
Since these rel-
the combined
ly the same as
s no value gain

ie bidding and
rm pays a sig-
rms were cor-
20.91; market
ver the market

, given the fact
some diversifi-
correlated, the
ower than the
This reduction
n-specific risk,
which are mea-
as of the two
debt capacity?
nd thus value.
nsidered sepa-

es if they have
gest that since
projects, new
objects, leading
firms. It may
nt opportuni-
nities, or vice
at value of the
it can now be

at have ready
e capital con-
ng on buying
er Inc. (video
ndise (funeral

ne of the firms
reas the other
irms can result
synergy is the
1, the assets of
alues in some
ture years.

ILLUSTRATION 25.4: Tax Benefits of Writing Up Asset Values after Takeover: Congoleum Inc.

One of the earliest leveraged buyouts (LBOs) occurred in 1979 and involved Congoleum Inc., a diversified firm in shipbuilding, flooring, and automotive accessories. Congoleum's own management bought out the firm. The favorable treatment that would be accorded the firm's assets by tax authorities was a major reason behind the takeover. After the takeover—estimated to cost approximately \$400 million—the firm was allowed to write up its assets to reflect their new market values and to claim depreciation on these new values. The estimated change in depreciation and the present value effect of this depreciation tax benefit, based on a tax rate of 48%, discounted at the firm's cost of capital of 14.5%, are shown in the following table:

Year	Depreciation Before	Depreciation After	Change in Depreciation	Tax Savings	Present Value
1980	\$ 8.00	\$ 35.51	\$ 27.51	\$13.20	\$11.53
1981	\$ 8.80	\$ 36.26	\$ 27.46	\$13.18	\$10.05
1982	\$ 9.68	\$ 37.07	\$ 27.39	\$13.15	\$ 8.76
1983	\$ 10.65	\$ 37.95	\$ 27.30	\$13.10	\$ 7.62
1984	\$ 11.71	\$ 21.23	\$ 9.52	\$ 4.57	\$ 2.32
1985	\$ 12.65	\$ 17.50	\$ 4.85	\$ 2.33	\$ 1.03
1986	\$ 13.66	\$ 16.00	\$ 2.34	\$ 1.12	\$ 0.43
1987	\$ 14.75	\$ 14.75	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
1988	\$ 15.94	\$ 15.94	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
1989	\$ 17.21	\$ 17.21	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00	\$ 0.00
1980-1989	\$123.05	\$249.42	\$126.37	\$60.66	\$41.76

Note that the increase in depreciation occurs in the first seven years, primarily as a consequence of higher asset values and accelerated depreciation. After year 7, however, the old and new depreciation schedules converge. The present value of the additional tax benefits from the higher depreciation, based amounted to \$41.76 million, about 10% of the overall price paid on the transaction.

In recent years, the tax code covering asset revaluations has been significantly tightened. While acquiring firms can still reassess the value of the acquired firm's assets, they can do so only up to fair value.

Debt Capacity If the cash flows of the acquiring and target firms are less than perfectly correlated, the cash flows of the combined firm will be less variable than the cash flows of the individual firms. This decrease in variability can result in an increase in debt capacity and in the value of the firm. The increase in value, however, has to be weighed against the immediate transfer of wealth to existing bondholders in both firms from the stockholders of both the acquiring and target firms. The bondholders in the premerger firms find themselves lending to a safer firm after the takeover. The interest rates they are receiving are based on the riskier premerger firms, however. If the interest rates are not renegotiated, the bonds will increase in price, increasing the bondholders' wealth at the expense of the stockholders.

There are several models available for analyzing the benefits of higher debt ratios as a consequence of takeovers. Lewellen analyzes the benefits in terms of reduced default risk, since the combined firm has less variable cash flows than do the individual firms. He provides a rationale for an increase in the value of debt after the merger, but at the expense of equity investors. It is not clear, therefore, that the value of the firm will increase after the merger. Stapleton evaluates the benefits of

higher debt capacity after mergers using option pricing. He shows that the effect of a merger on debt capacity is always positive, even when the earnings of the two firms are perfectly correlated. The debt capacity benefits increase as the earnings of the two firms become less correlated and as investors become more risk averse.

Consider again the merger of Lube & Auto and Dalton Motors. The value of the combined firm was the same as the sum of the values of the independent firms. The fact that the two firms were in different business lines reduced the variance in earnings, but value was not affected, because the capital structure of the firm remained unchanged after the merger and the costs of equity and debt were the weighted averages of the individual firms' costs.

The reduction in variance in earnings can increase debt capacity, which can increase value. If, after the merger of these two firms, the debt capacity for the combined firm were increased to 40 percent from 30 percent (leading to an increase in the beta to 1.21 and no change in the cost of debt), the value of the combined firm after the takeover can be estimated as shown in Table 25.3. As a consequence of the added debt, the value of the firm will increase from \$9,781.38 million to \$11,429.35 million.

Increase Growth and Price-Earnings Multiples Some acquisitions are motivated by the desire to increase growth and price-cash flow (or price-earnings) multiples. Though the benefits of higher growth are undeniable, the price paid for that growth will determine whether such acquisitions make sense. If the price paid for the growth exceeds the fair market value, the stock price of the acquiring firm will decline even though the expected future growth in its cash flows may increase as a consequence of the takeover.

This can be seen in the previous example. Dalton Motors, with projected

TABLE 25.3 Value of Debt Capacity—Lube & Auto and Dalton Motors

	Lube & Auto	Dalton Motors	Combined Firm— No New Debt	Combined Firm— Added Debt
Debt (%)	30%	30%	30%	40%
Cost of debt	6.00%	5.40%	5.65%	5.65%
Equity (%)	70%	70%	70%	60%
Cost of equity	13.60%	12.50%	12.95%	13.65%
Cost of capital—year 1	11.32%	10.37%	10.76%	10.45%
Cost of capital—year 2	11.32%	10.37%	10.76%	10.45%
Cost of capital—year 3	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%	10.45%
Cost of capital—year 4	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%	10.45%
Cost of capital—year 5	11.32%	10.37%	10.77%	10.45%
Cost of capital after	10.55%	10.37%	10.45%	9.76%
FCFF in year 1	\$ 120.00	\$ 220.00	\$ 340.00	\$ 340.00
FCFF in year 2	\$ 144.00	\$ 242.00	\$ 386.00	\$ 386.00
FCFF in year 3	\$ 172.80	\$ 266.20	\$ 439.00	\$ 439.00
FCFF in year 4	\$ 207.36	\$ 292.82	\$ 500.18	\$ 500.18
FCFF in year 5	\$ 248.83	\$ 322.10	\$ 570.93	\$ 570.93
Terminal value	\$5,796.97	\$7,813.00	\$13,609.97	\$16,101.22
Present value	\$4,020.91	\$5,760.47	\$ 9,781.38	\$11,429.35

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

McKinsey for evidence the acquiring parent could 58 projects study of 1990s, M on capital returns.⁸

1996 and bined firm

A study that only formed the Interstate promises energy is of

The r large number Mitchell and 1986 longer time tions rises benefits fr that 44 pe quirer paid

growth in c grow 20 per Motors pay decline, ever tors alone. S than Lube & sition, but t whether the

⁸This study was on April 20, 1

⁹KPMG measurement of the after the deal

¹⁰This study was in an article ti

t the effect of
s of the two
e earnings of
k averse.

The value of
endent firms.
e variance in
the firm re-
ebt were the

which can in-
he combined
se in the beta
firm after the
of the added
9.35 million.

re motivated
s) multiples.
that growth
paid for the
firm will de-
crease as a

h projected

Combined
Firm—
Added Debt

40%
5.65%
60%
13.65%
10.45%
10.45%
10.45%
10.45%
10.45%
9.76%
340.00
386.00
439.00
500.18
570.93
6,101.22
1,429.35

Damodaran,
sion of John

HOW OFTEN DOES SYNERGY ACTUALLY SHOW UP?

McKinsey & Co. examined 58 acquisition programs between 1972 and 1983 for evidence on two questions: (1) Did the return on the amount invested in the acquisitions exceed the cost of capital? (2) Did the acquisitions help the parent companies outperform the competition? They concluded that 28 of the 58 programs failed both tests, and six failed at least one test. In a follow-up study of 115 mergers in the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1990s, McKinsey concluded that 60 percent of the transactions earned returns on capital less than the cost of capital and that only 23 percent earned excess returns.⁸ In 1999, KPMG examined 700 of the most expensive deals between 1996 and 1998 and concluded that only 17 percent created value for the combined firm, 30 percent were value-neutral, and 53 percent destroyed value.⁹

A study looked at the eight largest bank mergers in 1995¹⁰ and concluded that only two (Chase/Chemical, First Chicago/NBD) subsequently outperformed the bank-stock index. The largest, Wells Fargo's acquisition of First Interstate, was a significant failure. Sirower (1996) takes a detailed look at the promises and failures of synergy and draws the gloomy conclusion that synergy is often promised but seldom delivered.

The most damaging piece of evidence on the outcome of acquisitions is the large number of acquisitions that are reversed within fairly short time periods. Mitchell and Lehn note that 20.2 percent of the acquisitions made between 1982 and 1986 were divested by 1988. Studies that have tracked acquisitions for longer time periods (10 years or more) have found the divestiture rate of acquisitions rises to almost 50 percent, suggesting that few firms enjoy the promised benefits from acquisitions. In another study, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) found that 44 percent of the mergers they studied were reversed, largely because the acquirer paid too much or because the operations of the two firms did not mesh.

growth in cash flows of 10 percent, acquires Lube & Auto, which is expected to grow 20 percent. The fair market value for Lube & Auto is \$4,020.91. If Dalton Motors pays more than this amount to acquire Lube & Auto, its stock price will decline, even though the combined firm will grow at a faster rate than Dalton Motors alone. Similarly, Dalton Motors, which sells at a lower multiple of cash flow than Lube & Auto, will increase its value as a multiple of cash flow after the acquisition, but the effect on the stockholders in the firm will still be determined by whether the price paid on the acquisition exceeds the fair value.

⁸This study was referenced in an article titled "Merger Mayhem" that appeared in *Barron's* on April 20, 1998.

⁹KPMG measured the success at creating value by comparing the postdeal stock price performance of the combined firm to the performance of the relevant industry segment for a year after the deal was completed.

¹⁰This study was done by Keefe, Bruyette, and Woods, an investment bank. It was referenced in an article titled "Merger Mayhem" in *Barron's*, April 20, 1998.

TAKEOVER VALUATION: BIASES AND COMMON ERRORS

The process of takeover valuation has potential pitfalls and biases that arise from the desire of the management of both the bidder and target firms to justify their points of view to their stockholders. The bidder firm aims to convince its stockholders that it is getting a bargain (i.e., that it is paying less than what the target firm is truly worth). In friendly takeovers, the target firm attempts to show its stockholders that the price it is receiving is a fair price (i.e., it is receiving at least what it is worth). In hostile takeovers, there is a role reversal, with bidding firms trying to convince target firm stockholders that they are not being cheated out of their fair share, and target firms arguing otherwise. Along the way, there are a number of common errors and biases in takeover valuation.

Use of Comparable Firms and Multiples

The prices paid in most takeovers are justified using the following sequence of actions: The acquirer assembles a group of firms comparable to the one being valued, selects a multiple to value the target firm, computes an average multiple for the comparable firms, and then makes subjective adjustments to this average. Each of these steps provides an opening for bias to enter into the process. Since no two firms are identical, the choice of comparable firms is a subjective one and can be tailored to justify the conclusion we want to reach. Similarly, in selecting a multiple, there are a number of possible choices—price-earnings ratios, price-cash flow ratios, price-book value ratios, and price-sales ratios, among others—and the multiple chosen will be the one that best suits our biases. Finally, once the average multiple has been obtained, subjective adjustments can be made to complete the story. In short, there is plenty of room for a biased firm to justify any price, using reasonable valuation models.

In some acquisition valuations, only firms that have been target firms in acquisitions are used as comparable firms, with the prices paid on the acquisitions being used to estimate multiples. The average multiple paid, which is called a transaction multiple, is then used to justify the price paid in an acquisition. This clearly creates a biased sample, and the values estimated using transactions multiples will generally be too high.

Mismatching Cash Flows and Discount Rates

One of the fundamental principles of valuation is that cash flows should be discounted using a consistent discount rate. Cash flows to equity should be discounted at the cost of equity and cash flows to the firm at the cost of capital; nominal cash flows should be discounted at the nominal discount rate and real cash flows at the real rate; after-tax cash flows should be discounted at the after-tax discount rate and pretax cash flows at the pretax rate. The failure to match cash flows with discount rates can lead to significant under- or overvaluation. Two of the more common mismatches include:

1. *Using the bidding firm's cost of equity or capital to discount the target firm's cash flows.* If the bidding firm raises the funds for the takeover, it is argued, its cost of equity should be used. This argument fails to take into account the fundamental

investment equity as the cost of equity to finance that firm's investments that of equity if

2. *Using the bidding firm's cost of equity to discount the target firm's cash flows.* If the bidding firm uses a different discount rate to value the target firm's cash flows, it is inconsistent reasoning, because the investor's required return is not decreasing if the discount rate of equity is in the target

Subsidizing

The value of the target firm can be attributed to its debt capacity. If the target firm has a high debt capacity, the value of the firm is high. If the target firm has a low debt capacity, the value of the firm is low. The capacity to

STRUCTURE

Once the target firm is acquired, the structure of the firm is the decision with synergies of how to put the two firms together. The choice of the structure by stockholders acquiring firm

Deciding on

The preceding considerations should be considered

at arise from
to justify their
nce its stock-
at the target
to show its
iving at least
bidding firms
reated out of
re are a num-

quence of ac-
being valued,
multiple for the
age. Each of
since no two
e and can be
ting a multi-
ce-cash flow
and the mul-
average mul-
ete the story.
using reason-

ms in acqui-
sitions being
a transaction
early creates
s will gener-

ould be dis-
e discounted
nominal cash
flows at the
discount rate
ws with dis-
e more com-

target firm's
qued, its cost
fundamental

investment principle that it is not who raises the money that determines the cost of equity as much as what the money is raised for. The same firm will face a higher cost of equity for funds raised to finance riskier projects and a lower cost of equity to finance safer projects. Thus the cost of equity in valuing the target will reflect that firm's riskiness (i.e., it is the target firm's cost of equity). Note also that since the cost of equity, as we have defined it, includes only nondiversifiable risk, arguments that the risk will decrease after the merger cannot be used to reduce the cost of equity if the risk being decreased is firm-specific risk.

2. *Using the cost of capital to discount the cash flows to equity.* If the bidding firm uses a mix of debt and equity to finance the acquisition of a target firm, the argument goes, the cost of capital should be used in discounting the target firm's cash flows to equity (cash flows left over after interest and principal payments). By this reasoning, the value of a share in IBM to an investor will depend on how the investor finances his or her acquisition of the share—increasing if the investor borrows to buy the stock (since the cost of debt is less than the cost of equity) and decreasing if the investor buys the stock using his or her own cash. The bottom line is that discounting the cash flows to equity at the cost of capital to obtain the value of equity is always wrong and will result in a significant overvaluation of the equity in the target firm.

Subsidizing the Target Firm

The value of the target firm should not include any portion of the value that should be attributed to the acquiring firm. For instance, assume that a firm with excess debt capacity or a high debt rating uses a significant amount of low-cost debt to finance an acquisition. If we estimated a low cost of capital for the target firm with a high debt ratio and a low after-tax cost of debt, we would overestimate the value of the firm. If the acquiring firm paid this price on the acquisition, it would represent a transfer of wealth from the acquiring firm's stockholders to the target firm's stockholders. Thus, it is not appropriate to use the acquiring firm's cost of debt or debt capacity to estimate the cost of capital for the target firm.

STRUCTURING THE ACQUISITION

Once the target firm has been identified and valued, the acquisition moves forward into the structuring phase. There are three interrelated steps in this phase. The first is the decision on how much to pay for the target firm, given that we have valued it with synergy and control built into the valuation. The second is the determination of how to pay for the deal (i.e., whether to use stock, cash, or some combination of the two) and whether to borrow any of the funds needed. The final step is the choice of the accounting treatment of the deal because it can affect both taxes paid by stockholders in the target firm and how the purchase is accounted for in the acquiring firm's income statement and balance sheets.

Deciding on an Acquisition Price

The preceding section explained how to value a target firm with control and synergy considerations built into the value. This value represents a ceiling on the price

that the acquirer can pay on the acquisition rather than a floor. If the acquirer pays the full value, there is no surplus value to claim for the acquirer's stockholders and the target firm's stockholders get the entire value of the synergy and control premiums. This division of value is unfair if the acquiring firm plays an indispensable role in creating the synergy and control premiums.

Consequently, the acquiring firm should try to keep as much of the premium as it can for its stockholders. Several factors, however, will act as constraints. They include:

- *The market price of the target firm, if it is publicly traded, prior to the acquisition.* Since acquisitions have to be based on the current market price, the greater the current market value of equity, the lower the potential for gain to the acquiring firm's stockholders. For instance, if the market price of a poorly managed firm already reflects a high probability that the management of the firm will be changed, there is likely to be little or no value gained from control.
- *The relative scarcity of the specialized resources that the target and the acquiring firm bring to the merger.* Since the bidding firm and the target firm are both contributors to the creation of synergy, the sharing of the benefits of synergy among the two parties will depend in large part on whether the bidding firm's contribution to the creation of the synergy is unique or easily replaced. If it can be easily replaced, the bulk of the synergy benefits will accrue to the target firm. If it is unique, the benefits will be shared much more equitably. Thus, when a firm with cash slack acquires a firm with many high-return projects, value is created. If there are a large number of firms with cash slack and relatively few firms with high-return projects, the bulk of the value of the synergy will accrue to the latter.
- *The presence of other bidders for the target firm.* When there is more than one bidder for a firm, the odds are likely to favor the target firm's stockholders. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) examined an extensive sample of 236 tender offers made between 1963 and 1984 and concluded that the benefits of synergy accrue primarily to the target firms when multiple bidders are involved in the takeover. They estimated the market-adjusted stock returns around the announcement of the takeover for the successful bidder to be 2 percent in single-bidder takeovers and -1.33% in contested takeovers.

Payment for the Target Firm

Once a firm has decided to pay a given price for a target firm, it has to follow up by deciding how it is going to pay for this acquisition. In particular, decisions have to be made about the following aspects of the deal: debt versus equity and cash versus stock.

Debt versus Equity A firm can raise the funds for an acquisition from either debt or equity. The mix will generally depend on the excess debt capacities of both the acquiring and the target firms. Thus, the acquisition of a target firm that is significantly underlevered may be carried out with a larger proportion of debt than the

acquisition
flected in t
acquiring f
to carry ou
the same i
additional
acquisition
do with th
ing firm pr
own stock

Cash versus
action. The
the acquisi
cash to pay
firm, wher
quiring fir
these appr
the followi

- *The av*
availabl
cash.
- *The pe*
new fi
firm's
the sto
at a p
acquis
lost in
ued ar
holder
premi
firm's :
- *Tax fa*
firm m
benefit
swap n

The final a
the numbe
quiring fir
of the acqu
the two fir
the more i
based on tl
in the follo

acquirer pays
stockholders and
control premi-
spensible role

the premium
s constraints.

ior to the ac-
market price,
potential for
arket price of
the manage-
value gained

nd the acquir-
firm are both
its of synergy
bidding firm's
aced. If it can
ie target firm.
Thus, when a
jects, value is
relatively few
y will accrue

more than one
stockholders.
of 236 tender
its of synergy
volved in the
ound the an-
ent in single-

to follow up
ecisions have
ity and cash

n either debt
s of both the
hat is signifi-
ebt than the

acquisition of one that is already at its optimal debt ratio. This, of course, is reflected in the value of the firm through the cost of capital. It is also possible that the acquiring firm has excess debt capacity and that it uses its ability to borrow money to carry out the acquisition. Although the mechanics of raising the money may look the same in this case, it is important that the value of the target firm not reflect this additional debt. As noted in the last section, the cost of capital used in valuing the acquisition should not reflect this debt raised. The additional debt has nothing to do with the target firm, and building it into the value will only result in the acquiring firm paying a premium for a value enhancement that rightfully belongs to its own stockholders.

Cash versus Stock There are three ways in which a firm can use equity in a transaction. The first is to use cash balances that have been built up over time to finance the acquisition. The second is to issue stock to the public, raise cash, and use the cash to pay for the acquisition. The third is to offer stock as payment for the target firm, where the payment is structured in terms of a stock swap—shares in the acquiring firm in exchange for shares in the target firm. The question of which of these approaches is best utilized by a firm cannot be answered without looking at the following factors:

- *The availability of cash on hand.* Clearly, the option of using cash on hand is available only to those firms that have accumulated substantial amounts of cash.
- *The perceived value of the stock.* When stock is issued to the public to raise new funds or when it is offered as payment on acquisitions, the acquiring firm's managers are making a judgment about what the perceived value of the stock is. In other words, managers who believe that their stock is trading at a price significantly below value should not use stock as currency on acquisitions, since what they gain on the acquisitions can be more than lost in the stock issue. However, firms that believe their stocks are overvalued are much more likely to use stock as currency in transactions. The stockholders in the target firm are also aware of this, and may demand a larger premium when the payment is made entirely in the form of the acquiring firm's stock.
- *Tax factors.* When an acquisition is a stock swap, the stockholders in the target firm may be able to defer capital gains taxes on the exchanged shares. Since this benefit can be significant in an acquisition, the potential tax gains from a stock swap may be large enough to offset any perceived disadvantages.

The final aspect of a stock swap is the setting of the terms of the stock swap (i.e., the number of shares of the acquired firm that will be offered per share of the acquiring firm). While this amount is generally based on the market price at the time of the acquisition, the ratio that results may be skewed by the relative mispricing of the two firms' securities, with the more overpriced firm gaining at the expense of the more underpriced (or at least less overpriced) firm. A fairer ratio would be based on the relative values of the two firms' shares. This can be seen quite clearly in the following illustration.

ILLUSTRATION 25.5: Setting the Exchange Ratio

We will begin by reviewing our valuation for Digital in Figure 25.5. The value of Digital with the synergy and control components is \$6,964 million. This is obtained by adding the value of control (\$2,421 million) and the value of synergy (\$2,422 million) to the status quo value of \$2,110 million. Digital also has \$1,006 million in debt, and 146.789 million shares outstanding. The maximum value per share for Digital can then be estimated as follows:

Maximum value per share for Digital = (Firm value – Debt)/Number of shares outstanding
= (\$6,964 – \$1,006)/146.789 = \$40.59

The estimated value per share for Compaq is \$27, based on the total value of the firm of \$38,546.91 million, the debt outstanding of \$3.2 billion, and 1,305.76 million shares.

Value per share for Compaq = (\$38,546.91 – \$3,200)/1,305.76 = \$27.00

The appropriate exchange ratio, based on value per share, can be estimated:

Exchange ratio_{Compaq, Digital} = Value per share_{Digital}/Value per share_{Compaq}
= \$40.59/\$27.00 = 1.50 Compaq shares per Digital share

If the exchange ratio is set above this number, Compaq stockholders will lose to the benefit of Digital stockholders. If it is set below, Digital stockholders will lose to the benefit of Compaq stockholders.

In fact, Compaq paid \$30 in cash and offered 0.945 shares of Compaq stock for every Digital share. Assessing the value of this offer,

Value per Digital share (Compaq offer) = \$30 + 0.945 (\$27.07)	\$55.58
Value per Digital share (assessed value)	\$40.59
Overpayment by Compaq	\$14.99

Based on our assessments of value and control, Compaq overpaid on this acquisition for Digital.



exchratio.xls: This spreadsheet allows you to estimate the exchange ratio on an acquisition, given the value of control and synergy.

Accounting Considerations

There is one final decision that seems to play a disproportionate role in the way in which acquisitions are structured and in setting their terms, and that is the accounting treatment. This section describes the accounting choices and examines why firms choose one over the other.

Purchase versus Pooling There are two basic choices in accounting for a merger or acquisition. In purchase accounting, the entire value of the acquisition is reflected on the acquiring firm's balance sheet, and the difference between the acquisition price and the restated value of the assets of the target firm¹¹ is shown as goodwill for the acquiring firm. The goodwill is then written off (amortized) over a

¹¹The acquiring firm is allowed to restate the assets that are on the books at fair value. This changes the tax basis for the assets, and can affect depreciation in subsequent periods.

Component
Synergy
Control Premium
Status Quo Valuation

FIGURE 25.1
Source: Coi
copyright ©
Wiley & So

period of 4
tax deduct
pooling, th
mium paid
For ar
following
■ Each
when
years 1
■ Only v
preferi
■ Stock
prior t
■ No tra
■ The cc
the coi
The q
heavily on
if they do
qualify. Fu

Component	Valuation Guidelines	Value
Synergy	Value the combined firm with synergy built in. In the case of Compaq/Digital, the synergy comes from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual cost savings, expected to be \$100 million. • Slightly higher growth rate. 	\$2,422 million
Control Premium	Value Digital as if optimally managed. This was done by assuming: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher margins and a return on capital equal to the cost of capital. • Higher debt ratio and a lower cost of capital. 	\$2,421 million
Status Quo Valuation	Value Digital as is, with existing inputs for investment, financing, and dividend policy.	\$2,110 million

FIGURE 25.5 Valuing Digital for Compaq

Source: *Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice*, Second Edition, by Aswath Damodaran, copyright © 2001 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. This material is used by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

period of 40 years, reducing reported earnings in each year. The amortization is not tax deductible and thus does not affect cash flows. If an acquisition qualifies for pooling, the book values of the target and acquiring firms are aggregated. The premium paid over market value is not shown on the acquiring firm's balance sheet.

For an acquisition to qualify for pooling, the merging firms have to meet the following conditions:

- Each of the combining firms has to be independent; pooling is not allowed when one of the firms is a subsidiary or division of another firm in the two years prior to the merger.
- Only voting common stock can be issued to cover the transaction; the issue of preferred stock or multiple classes of common stock is not allowed.
- Stock buybacks or any other distributions that change the capital structure prior to the merger are prohibited.
- No transactions that benefit only a group of stockholders are allowed.
- The combined firm cannot sell a significant portion of the existing businesses of the combined companies, other than duplicate facilities or excess capacity.

The question whether an acquisition will qualify for pooling seems to weigh heavily on the managers of acquiring firms. Some firms will not make acquisitions if they do not qualify for pooling, or they will pay premiums to ensure that they do qualify. Furthermore, as the conditions for pooling make clear, firms are con-

strained in what they can do after the merger. Firms seem to be willing to accept these constraints, such as restricting stock buybacks and major asset divestitures, just to qualify for pooling.

The bias toward pooling may seem surprising, since this choice does not affect cash flows and value, but it is really not surprising when we consider the source of the bias. Firms are concerned about the effects of the goodwill amortization on their earnings, and about stockholder reactions to the lower earnings. Are firms that use purchase accounting punished by markets when they report lower earnings in subsequent periods? Hong, Kaplan, and Mandelkar (1978) examined the monthly excess returns of 122 firms that acquired other firms between 1954 and 1964 using the pooling technique for 60 months after the acquisition. They compared these findings to 37 acquisitions that used the purchase approach to see if markets were fooled by the pooling technique. They found no evidence that the pooling raised stock prices or that the purchase technique lowered prices. The results are shown in Figure 25.6.

Note that there are no positive excess returns associated with pooling in the 60 months following the merger, nor are there negative excess returns associated with purchase in the same time period. Lindenberg and Ross (1999) studied 387 pooling and 1,055 purchase transactions between 1990 and 1999. They found that the stock price reaction to the acquisition announcement is more positive for purchase transactions than for pooling transactions, and that the market value of firms that use purchase accounting is not adversely affected by the reduction in earnings associated with amortization. They concluded that the earnings multiples of firms that use purchase accounting adjust to offset the decrease in earnings caused by amortization. To illustrate, a 10 percent decrease in earnings because of goodwill amortization is accompanied by a 12.1 percent increase in the price-earnings ratio; the net

effect is the earnings ef

There of the acq acquiring t purchase a nize the ca acquiring t significant

In-Process

mix, espec can follow premium p takes a one earnings,¹³ amortized has no cas WorldCom significant

The p charge is a advantage noted that miums on

In earl crack dow ogy firms f not be in t reported e and value i

Final Cons

counting e fect on cas will punish off of goo fore and a empirical e

When can be exp

■ Firms poolin




FIGURE 25.6 Pooling versus Purchase Accounting: Effect on Excess Returns


¹²For tax pu

¹³The write-rately from

ling to accept
t divestitures,

oes not affect
the source of
ortization on
gs. Are firms
ower earnings
xamined the
een 1954 and
n. They com-
ach to see if
ence that the
rices. The re-

ling in the 60
sociated with
l 387 pooling
und that the
for purchase
of firms that
arnings asso-
of firms that
d by amorti-
will amorti-
ratio; the net



effect is that stock price does not drop. Thus markets seem to discount the negative earnings effect of amortizing goodwill.

There is another consideration, as well. When pooling is used, the shareholders of the acquired firm can transfer their cost basis¹² to the shares they receive in the acquiring firm and not pay capital gains taxes until they sell these shares. When purchase accounting is used, the stockholders of the acquired firm have to recognize the capital gain at the time of the transaction, even if they receive stock in the acquiring firm. Given the substantial premiums paid on acquisitions, this may be a significant factor in why firms choose to use pooling.

In-Process R&D In the past few years, another accounting choice has entered the mix, especially for acquisitions in the technology sector. Here, firms that qualify can follow up an acquisition by writing off all or a significant proportion of the premium paid on the acquisition as in-process R&D. The net effect is that the firm takes a one-time charge at the time of the acquisition that does not affect operating earnings,¹³ and it eliminates or drastically reduces the goodwill that needs to be amortized in subsequent periods. The one-time expense is not tax-deductible and has no cash flow consequences. In acquisitions such as Lotus by IBM and MCI by WorldCom, the in-process R&D charge allowed the acquiring firms to write off a significant portion of the acquisition price at the time of the deal.

The potential to reduce the dreaded goodwill amortization with a one-time charge is appealing for many firms, and studies find that firms try to take maximum advantage of this option. Jeng and Lev (1998) documented this tendency and also noted that firms that qualify for this provision tend to pay significantly larger premiums on acquisitions than firms that do not.

In early 1999, as both the accounting standards board and the SEC sought to crack down on the misuse of in-process R&D, the top executives at high-technology firms fought back, claiming that many acquisitions that were viable now would not be in the absence of this provision. It is revealing of managers' obsession with reported earnings that a provision that has no effects on cash flows, discount rates, and value is making such a difference in whether acquisitions get done.

Final Considerations The managers of acquiring firms clearly weigh in the accounting effects of acquisitions, even when accounting choices have little or no effect on cash flows. This behavior is rooted in a fear of how much financial markets will punish firms that report lower earnings, largely as a consequence of the write-off of goodwill. Given the transparency of this write-off (firms report earnings before and after goodwill amortization), this fear seems to be misplaced, and the empirical evidence backs that up.

When accounting choices weigh disproportionately in the outcome, the results can be expensive for stockholders in the acquiring firm. In particular,

- Firms will reject some good acquisitions simply because they fail to meet the pooling test or because in-process R&D cannot be written off.

¹²For tax purposes, the cost basis reflects what you originally paid for the shares.

¹³The write-off of in-process R&D is viewed as a nonrecurring charge and is shown separately from operating income.

- Firms will overpay on acquisitions just to qualify for favorable accounting treatment.
- To meet the requirements for pooling, firms will often acquire entire companies rather than the divisions that they are interested in and defer asset divestitures that make economic sense.

If the signals emerging from both the SEC and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have any basis, the rules for both pooling and writing off in-process R&D will be substantially tightened. In fact, it looks likely that firms will not be able to use pooling past 2001 and that they will have to write off goodwill over a much shorter period than the current 40 years.¹⁴ These changes, though bitterly opposed by many top managers, should be welcomed by stockholders.

ANALYZING MANAGEMENT AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS

The first section, when describing the different types of acquisitions, pointed out two important differences between mergers and buyouts. The first is that, unlike a merger, a buyout does not involve two firms coming together and creating a consolidated entity. Instead, the target firm is acquired by a group of investors that may include the management of the firm. The second is that the target firm in a buyout usually becomes a private business. Some buyouts in the 1980s also used large proportions of debt, leading to their categorization as leveraged buyouts. Each of these differences does have an effect on how we approach the valuation of buyouts.

IMPROVING THE ODDS OF SUCCESS ON MERGERS

The evidence on mergers adding value is murky at best and negative at worst. Considering all the contradictory evidence contained in different studies,¹⁵ we conclude that:

- Mergers of equals (firms of equal size) seem to have a lower probability of succeeding than acquisitions of a smaller firm by a much larger firm.¹⁶
- Cost-saving mergers, where the cost savings are concrete and immediate, seem to have a better chance of delivering on synergy than mergers based on growth synergy.
- Acquisition programs that focus on buying small private businesses for consolidations have had more success than acquisition programs that concentrate on acquiring publicly traded firms.
- Hostile acquisitions seem to do better at delivering improved postacquisition performance than friendly mergers.

¹⁴Given the formidable lobbying skills of incumbent managers, we would not be surprised to see this change modified or delayed.

¹⁵Some of this evidence is anecdotal and is based on the study of just a few mergers.

¹⁶This might well reflect the fact that failures of mergers of equals are much more visible than failures of the small firm/large firm combinations.

Valuation

The fact that a firm to be acquired has potential for growth is the first information that managers in a buyout must have. The fact that a firm has made a buyout may become a

The fact that a firm also has a high debt ratio are much more important. It can create a high debt ratio in the case of a leveraged buyout.

If going private is a goal, the corporate value may be expected to increase on long-term debt. Higher return on assets against the cost of capital may terminate the high debt ratio, however, if the firm is an average private. The firm gained for

Valuing a

We have a high debt ratio. This high debt ratio is too little debt. It is partially due to the level in the market. It means that the firm should reduce its debt. Michael Jensen flows wise to maximize the debt ratio off a significant

The elements in valuation

e accounting

re companies
t divestitures

ng Standards
off in-process
s will not be
odwill over a
h bitterly op-

pointed out
hat, unlike a
ing a consol-
ors that may
i in a buyout
ed large pro-
Each of these
uyouts.

at worst,
dies,¹⁵ we

probability
ger firm.¹⁶
mediate,
n mergers

nesses for
rams that

postacqui-

ve surprised to

gers.

re visible than

Valuation of a Buyout

The fact that buyouts involve only the target firm and that there is no acquiring firm to consider makes valuation much more straightforward. Clearly, there is no potential for synergy and therefore no need to value it. However, the fact that the managers of a firm are also the acquirers of the firm does create two issues. The first is that managers have access to information that investors do not have. This information may allow managers to conclude, with far more certainty than would an external acquirer, that their firm is undervalued. This may be one reason for the buyout. The second is that the management of the firm remains the same after the buyout, but the way in which investment, financing, and dividend decisions are made may change. This happens because managers, once they become owners, may become much more concerned about maximizing firm value.

The fact that firms that are involved in buyouts become private businesses can also have an effect on value. Chapter 24 noted that investments in private businesses are much more difficult to liquidate than investments in publicly traded firms. This can create a significant discount on value. One reason this discount may be smaller in the case of buyouts is that many of them are done with the clear intention, once the affairs of the firm have been put in order, of taking the firm public again.

If going private is expected to increase managers' responsiveness to value maximization in the long term—since they are part owners of the firm—the way to incorporate this in value is to include it in the cash flows. The increased efficiency can be expected to increase cash flows if it increases operating margins. The emphasis on long-term value should be visible in investment choices and should lead to a higher return on capital and higher growth. This advantage has to be weighed against the capital rationing the firm might face because of limited access to financial markets, which might reduce future growth and profits. The net effect will determine the change in value. The empirical evidence on going-private transactions, however, is clear-cut. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984) reported, for example, an average abnormal return of 30 percent for 81 firms in their sample that went private. Thus financial markets, at least, seem to believe that there is value to be gained for some public firms in going private.

Valuing a Leveraged Buyout

We have seen that leveraged buyouts are financed disproportionately with debt. This high leverage is justified in several ways. First, if the target firm initially has too little debt relative to its optimal debt ratio, the increase in debt can be explained partially by the increase in value moving to the optimal ratio provides. The debt level in most leveraged buyouts exceeds the optimal debt ratio, however, which means that some of the debt will have to be paid off quickly in order for the firm to reduce its cost of capital and its default risk. A second explanation is provided by Michael Jensen, who proposes that managers cannot be trusted to invest free cash flows wisely for their stockholders; they need the discipline of debt payments to maximize cash flows on projects and firm value. A third rationale is that the high debt ratio is temporary and will disappear once the firm liquidates assets and pays off a significant portion of the debt.

The extremely high leverage associated with leveraged buyouts creates two problems in valuation, however. First, it significantly increases the riskiness of the cash

flows to equity investors in the firm by increasing the fixed payments to debt holders in the firm. Thus, the cost of equity has to be adjusted to reflect the higher financial risk the firm will face after the leveraged buyout. Second, the expected decrease in this debt over time, as the firm liquidates assets and pays off debt, implies that the cost of equity will also decrease over time. Since the cost of debt and debt ratio will change over time as well, the cost of capital will also change in each period.

In valuing a leveraged buyout, then, we begin with the estimates of free cash flow to the firm, just as we did in traditional valuation. However, instead of discounting these cash flows back at a fixed cost of capital, we discount them back at a cost of capital that will vary from year to year. Once we value the firm, we then can compare the value to the total amount paid for the firm.

ILLUSTRATION 25.6: Valuing a Leveraged Buyout: Congoleum Inc.

The managers of Congoleum Inc. targeted the firm for a leveraged buyout in 1979.¹⁷ They planned to buy back the stock at \$38 per share (it was trading at \$24 prior to the takeover) and to finance the acquisition primarily with debt. The breakdown of the cost and financing of the deal is:

Cost of Takeover

Buy back stock: $\$38 \times 12.2$ million shares	\$463.60 million
Expenses of takeover	\$ 7.00 million
Total cost	\$470.60 million

Financing Mix for Takeover

Equity:	\$117.30 million
Debt	\$327.10 million
Preferred stock (@13.5%)	\$ 26.20 million
Total proceeds	\$470.60 million

There were three sources of debt:

1. Bank debt of \$125 million, at a 14% interest rate, to be repaid in annual installments of \$16.666 million starting in 1980.
2. Senior notes of \$115 million, at 11.25% interest rate, to be repaid in equal annual installments of \$7.636 million each year from 1981.
3. Subordinated notes of \$92 million, at 12.25% interest, to be repaid in equal annual installments of \$7.636 million each year from 1989.

The firm also assumed \$12.2 million of existing debt, at the advantageous rate of 7.50%; this debt would be repaid in 1982.¹⁸

The firm projected operating income (EBIT), capital spending, depreciation, and change in working capital from 1980 to 1984 as shown in the following table (in millions of dollars):

¹⁷The numbers in this illustration were taken from the Harvard Business School case titled "Congoleum." The case is reprinted in Fruhan, Kester, Mason, Piper, and Ruback (1992).

¹⁸The debt value exceeds the transaction amount, reflecting transaction costs and investment banking fees.

Year
Current
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

The earnings was expected
Congoleum
the time of the
We began
obtain these
(which were

EBIT
- EBIT (t)
= EBIT (1 - t)
+ Depreciation
- Capital exp
- ΔWC
= FCFF

We follow
debt and equity
schedule, and
discounting
why the equity

Debt
Equity
Preferred stock
Debt/capital
Equity/capital
Preferred stock
Beta
Cost of equity
After-tax cost
Cost of preferred
Cost of capital

An alternative
use the book

¹⁹We have used
firm has an expected
²⁰The book value

It is assumed that

to debt holders
higher financial
ected decrease in
, implies that the
d debt ratio will
period.
ates of free cash
r, instead of dis-
nt them back at
he firm, we then

Year	EBIT	Capital Spending	Depreciation	Δ Working Capital
Current	\$ 89.80	\$ 6.8	\$ 7.5	\$ 4.0
1980	\$ 71.69	\$15.0	\$35.51	\$ 2.0
1981	\$ 90.84	\$16.2	\$36.26	\$14.0
1982	\$115.73	\$17.5	\$37.07	\$23.3
1983	\$133.15	\$18.9	\$37.95	\$11.2
1984	\$137.27	\$20.4	\$21.93	\$12.8

The earnings before interest and taxes were expected to grow 8% after 1984, and the capital spending was expected to be offset by depreciation.¹⁹

Congoleum had a beta of 1.25 in 1979 prior to the leveraged buyout. The Treasury bond rate at the time of the leveraged buyout was 9.5%, and the tax rate was 48%.

We begin the analysis by estimating the expected cash flows to the firm from 1980 to 1985. To obtain these estimates, we subtract the net capital expenditures and changes in working capital (which were provided) from the after-tax operating income.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
EBIT	\$71.69	\$90.84	\$115.73	\$133.15	\$137.27	\$148.25
- EBIT (t)	\$34.41	\$43.60	\$ 55.55	\$ 63.91	\$ 65.89	\$ 71.16
= EBIT (1 - t)	\$37.28	\$47.24	\$ 60.18	\$ 69.24	\$ 71.38	\$ 77.09
+ Depreciation	\$35.51	\$36.26	\$ 37.07	\$ 37.95	\$ 21.93	\$ 21.62
- Capital expenditures	\$15.00	\$16.20	\$ 17.50	\$ 18.90	\$ 20.40	\$ 21.62
- Δ WC	\$ 2.00	\$14.00	\$ 23.30	\$ 11.20	\$ 12.80	\$ 5.00
= FCFF	\$55.79	\$53.30	\$ 56.45	\$ 77.09	\$ 60.11	\$ 72.09

We follow up by estimating the cost of capital for the firm each year, based on our estimates of debt and equity each year. The value of debt for future years is estimated based on the repayment schedule, and it decreases over time. The value of equity in each of the future years is estimated by discounting the expected cash flows in equity beyond that year at the cost of equity. (This explains why the equity in 1980 is greater than the book value of equity.)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Debt	\$327.10	\$309.96	\$285.17	\$260.62	\$236.04	\$211.45
Equity	\$275.39	\$319.40	\$378.81	\$441.91	\$504.29	\$578.48
Preferred stock	\$26.20	\$26.20	\$26.20	\$26.20	\$26.20	\$26.20
Debt/capital	52.03%	47.28%	41.32%	35.76%	30.79%	25.91%
Equity/capital	43.80%	48.72%	54.89%	60.64%	65.79%	70.88%
Preferred stock/capital	4.17%	4.00%	3.80%	3.60%	3.42%	3.21%
Beta	2.02547	1.87988	1.73426	1.62501	1.54349	1.4745
Cost of equity	20.64%	19.84%	19.04%	18.44%	17.99%	17.61%
After-tax cost of debt	6.53%	6.53%	6.53%	6.53%	6.53%	5.00%
Cost of preferred stock	13.51%	13.51%	13.51%	13.51%	13.51%	13.51%
Cost of capital	13.00%	13.29%	13.66%	14.00%	14.31%	14.21%

An alternative approach to estimating equity that does not require iterations or circular reasoning is to use the book value of equity rather than the estimated market value in calculating debt-equity ratios.²⁰

¹⁹We have used the assumptions provided by the investment banker in this case. It is troubling, however, that the firm has an expected growth rate of 8 percent a year forever without reinvesting any money back.

²⁰The book value of equity can be obtained as follows:


$$BV \text{ of equity}_t = BV \text{ of equity}_{t-1} + \text{Net income}_t$$

It is assumed that there will be no dividends paid to equity investors in the initial years of a leveraged buyout.

The cash flows to the firm and the cost of capital in the terminal year (1985), in conjunction with the expected growth rate of 8%,²¹ are used to estimate the terminal value of equity (at the end of 1984):

Terminal value of firm (end of 1984) = $FCFE_{1985} / (k_{e,1985} - .08)$
= $\$72.09 / (.1421 - .08) = \$1,161$ million

The expected cash flows to the firm and the terminal value were discounted back to the present at the cost of capital to yield a present value of \$820.21 million.²² Since the acquisition of Congoleum cost only \$470.6 million, this acquisition creates value for the acquiring investors.

 **merglbo.xls:** This spreadsheet allows you to evaluate the cash flows and the value of a leveraged buyout.

CONCLUSION

Acquisitions take several forms and occur for different reasons. Acquisitions can be categorized based on what happens to the target firm after the acquisition. A target firm can be consolidated into the acquiring entity (merger), create a new entity in combination with the acquiring firm, or remain independent (buyout).

There are four steps in analyzing acquisitions. First, we specify the reasons for acquisitions and list five: the undervaluation of the target firm, benefit from diversification, the potential for synergy, the value created by changing the way the target firm is run and management self-interest. Second, we choose a target firm whose characteristics make it the best candidate, given the motive chosen in the first step. Third, we value the target firm, assuming it would continue to be run by its current managers and then revalue it assuming better management. We define the difference between these two values as the value of control. We also value each of the different sources of operating and financial synergy and consider the combined value as the value of total synergy. Fourth, we look at the mechanics of the acquisition. We examine how much the acquiring firm should consider paying, given the value estimated in the prior step for the target firm, including control and synergy benefits. We also look at whether the acquisition should be financed with cash or stock, and how the choice of the accounting treatment of the acquisition affects this choice.

Buyouts share some characteristics with acquisitions, but they also vary on a couple of important ones. The absence of an acquiring firm, the fact that the managers of the firm are its acquirers, and the conversion of the acquired firm into a private business all have implications for value. If the buyout is financed predominantly with debt, making it a leveraged buyout, the debt ratio will change in future years, leading to changes in the costs of equity, debt, and capital in those years.

²¹While this may seem to be a high growth rate to sustain forever, it would have been appropriate in 1979. Inflation and interest rates were much higher then than in the 1990s.

²²When the cost of capital changes on a year-to-year basis, the discounting has to be based on a cumulative cost. For instance, the cash flow in year 3 will be discounted back as follows:

PV of cash flow in year 3 = $56.45 / (1.13)(1.1329)(1.1366)$

QUESTION

1. The fol
Grumr

Revenu
Cost of
Depreci
Tax rate
Workin
Market
Outstar

Both fir
expecte
are rate
rate is 7

As a
goods s
borrow

a. Estim
b. Estim
c. Estim
d. Estim
e. How

2. In the
combin
as a res
capital
A rating
combin
a. Estim
b. Estim
c. Who

3. In April
tion for
about th

Revenue
Cost of
Deprecia
Tax rate
Capital
Working
Beta
Expected
Expected
Growth
Beta afte

QUESTIONS AND SHORT PROBLEMS

1. The following are the details of two potential merger candidates, Northrop and Grumman, in 1993:

	<i>Northrop</i>	<i>Grumman</i>
Revenues	\$4,400.00	\$3,125.00
Cost of goods sold (without depreciation)	87.50%	89.00%
Depreciation	\$200.00	\$74.00
Tax rate	35.00%	35.00%
Working capital	10% of revenue	10% of revenue
Market value of equity	\$2,000.00	\$1,300.00
Outstanding debt	\$160.00	\$250.00

Both firms are expected to grow 5% a year in perpetuity. Capital spending is expected to be 20% of depreciation. The beta for both firms is 1, and both firms are rated BBB, with an interest rate on their debt of 8.5% (The Treasury bond rate is 7%, and the risk premium is 5.5%.)

As a result of the merger, the combined firm is expected to have a cost of goods sold of only 86% of total revenues. The combined firm does not plan to borrow additional debt.

- Estimate the value of Grumman, operating independently.
 - Estimate the value of Northrop, operating independently.
 - Estimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy.
 - Estimate the value of the combined firm, with synergy.
 - How much is the operating synergy worth?
2. In the Grumman-Northrop example described in the previous question, the combined firm did not take on additional debt after the acquisition. Assume that as a result of the merger the firm's optimal debt ratio increases to 20% of total capital from current levels. (At that level of debt, the combined firm will have an A rating, with an interest rate on its debt of 8%.) If it does not increase debt, the combined firm's rating will be A+ (with an interest rate of 7.75%).
- Estimate the value of the combined firm if it stays at its existing debt ratio.
 - Estimate the value of the combined firm if it moves to its optimal debt ratio.
 - Who gains this additional value if the firm moves to the optimal debt ratio?
3. In April 1994, Novell, Inc. announced its plan to acquire WordPerfect Corporation for \$1.4 billion. At the time of the acquisition, the relevant information about the two companies was as follows:

	<i>Novell</i>	<i>WordPerfect</i>
Revenues	\$1,200.00	\$600.00
Cost of goods sold (without depreciation)	57.00%	75.00%
Depreciation	\$42.00	\$25.00
Tax rate	35.00%	35.00%
Capital spending	\$75.00	\$40.00
Working capital (as % of revenue)	40.00%	30.00%
Beta	1.45	1.25
Expected growth rate in revenues/EBIT	25.00%	15.00%
Expected period of high growth	10 years	10 years
Growth rate after high-growth period	6.00%	6.00%
Beta after high-growth period	1.10	1.10

Capital spending will be 115% of depreciation after the high-growth period. Neither firm has any debt outstanding. The Treasury bond rate is 7%.

- Estimate the value of Novell, operating independently.
 - Estimate the value of WordPerfect, operating independently.
 - Estimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy.
- d. As a result of the merger, the combined firm is expected to grow 24% a year for the high-growth period. Estimate the value of the combined firm with the higher growth.
- e. What is the synergy worth? What is the maximum price Novell can pay for WordPerfect?
4. Assume, in the Novell-WordPerfect merger described in the preceding question, that it will take five years for the firms to work through their differences and start realizing their synergy benefits. What is the synergy worth under these circumstances?
5. In 1996, Aetna, a leading player in health insurance, announced its intentions to acquire U.S. Healthcare, the nation's largest health maintenance organization, and provided synergy as a rationale. On the announcement of the merger, Aetna's stock price, which was \$57, dropped to \$52.50, while U.S. Healthcare's stock price surged from \$31 to \$37.50. Aetna had 400 million shares, and U.S. Healthcare had 50 million shares outstanding at the time of the announcement.
- Estimate the value, if any, that financial markets are attaching to synergy in this merger.
 - How would you reconcile the market reaction to the rationale presented by management for the acquisition?
6. IH Corporation, a farm equipment manufacturer, has accumulated almost \$2 billion in losses over the past seven years of operations and is in danger of not being able to carry forward these losses. EG Corporation, an extremely profitable financial service firm, which had \$3 billion in taxable income in its most recent year, is considering acquiring IH Corporation. The tax authorities will allow EG Corporation to offset its taxable income with the carried-forward losses. The tax rate for EG Corporation is 40%, and the cost of capital is 12%.
- Estimate the value of the tax savings that will occur as a consequence of the merger.
 - What is the value of the tax savings if the tax authorities allow EG Corporation to spread the carried-forward losses over four years (i.e., allow \$200 million of the carried-forward losses to offset income each year for the next four years)?
7. You are considering a takeover of PMT Corporation, a firm that has significantly underperformed its peer group over the past five years, and you wish to estimate the value of control. The data on PMT Corporation, the peer group, and the best-managed firm in the group are:

	PMT Corporation	Peer Group	Best-Managed Firm
Return on assets (after-tax)	8.00%	12.00%	18.00%
Dividend payout ratio	50.00%	30.00%	20.00%
Debt-equity ratio	10.00%	50.00%	50.00%
Interest rate on debt	7.50%	8.00%	8.00%
Beta	Not available	1.30	1.30

PMT C
period
growth
the stal
lion shz
for all f
a. Valu
cont
b. Valu
man
c. Valu
man
8. You are
some rc
ments a

Revenues
- Expenses
- Depreciat
= EBIT
- Interest
Taxable inc
- Tax
= Net incon

The cap
the sam
at 20%
The l
\$3 milli
the end
books p
a. Estin
b. The
uity
calcu

c. Com
d. Evalu

growth period.
7%.

w 24% a year
firm with the

ll can pay for

ding question,
fferences and
nder these cir-

intentions to
organization,
f the merger,
Healthcare's
ares, and U.S.
announcement.
to synergy in

presented by

ed almost \$2
langer of not
remely prof-
ne in its most
orities will al-
ried-forward
pital is 12%.
quence of the

EG Corpora-
allow \$200
for the next

t has signifi-
you wish to
peer group,

Managed Firm

3.00%
0.00%
0.00%
3.00%
1.30

PMT Corporation reported earnings per share of \$2.50 in the most recent time period and is expected to reach stable growth in five years, after which the growth rate is expected to be 6% for all firms in this group. The beta during the stable-growth period is expected to be 1 for all firms. There are 100 million shares outstanding, and the Treasury bond rate is 7% (the tax rate is 40% for all firms).

- Value the equity in PMT Corporation assuming that the current management continues in place.
 - Value the equity in PMT Corporation assuming that it improves its performance to peer group levels.
 - Value the equity in PMT Corporation assuming that it improves its performance to the level of the best managed firm in the group.
8. You are attempting to do a leveraged buyout of Boston Turkey but have run into some roadblocks. You have some partially completed projected cash flow statements and need help to complete them.

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Terminal Year
Revenues	\$1,100,000	\$1,210,000	\$1,331,000	\$1,464,100	\$1,610,510	\$1,707,141
- Expenses	\$ 440,000	\$ 484,000	\$ 532,400	\$ 585,640	\$ 644,204	\$ 682,856
- Depreciation	\$ 100,000	\$ 110,000	\$ 121,000	\$ 133,100	\$ 146,410	\$ 155,195
= EBIT	\$ 560,000	\$ 616,000	\$ 677,600	\$ 745,360	\$ 819,896	\$ 869,090
- Interest	\$ 360,000	\$ 324,000	\$ 288,000	\$ 252,000	\$ 216,000	\$ 180,000
Taxable income	\$ 200,000	\$ 292,000	\$ 389,600	\$ 493,360	\$ 603,896	\$ 689,090
- Tax	\$ 80,000	\$ 116,800	\$ 155,840	\$ 197,344	\$ 241,558	\$ 275,636
= Net income	\$ 120,000	\$ 175,200	\$ 233,760	\$ 296,016	\$ 362,338	\$ 413,454

The capital expenditures are expected to be \$120,000 next year and to grow at the same rate as revenues for the rest of the period. Working capital will be kept at 20% of revenues (revenues this year were \$1 million).

The leveraged buyout will be financed with a mix of \$1 million of equity and \$3 million of debt (at an interest rate of 12%). Part of the debt will be repaid by the end of year 5, and the debt remaining at the end of year 5 will remain on the books permanently.

- Estimate the cash flows to equity and the firm for the next five years.
- The cost of equity in year 1 has been computed. Compute the cost of equity each year for the rest of the period (use book value of equity for the calculation).

Item	Year 1
Equity	\$1,000,000
Debt	\$3,000,000
Debt-equity ratio	3
Beta	2.58
Cost of equity	24.90%

- Compute the terminal value of the firm.
- Evaluate whether the leveraged buyout will create value.

9. J & L Chemical is a profitable chemical manufacturing firm. The business, however, is highly cyclical, and the profits of the firm have been volatile. The management of the firm is considering acquiring a food-processing firm to reduce the earnings volatility and exposure to economic cycles.
- Would such an action be in the best interests of stockholders? Explain.
 - Would your analysis be any different if J & L was a private firm? Explain.
 - Is there any condition under which you would argue for such an acquisition for a publicly traded firm?

The value sets as of real as own vari an asset c traded st

This c may be d the classe value of t mation iss this chapt

REAL VEF

Real estat determine cash flow equal, the ciated wit

There are many cannot be the two n traditiona difference: vestments. be valued These diff sets at the hence, is growth in ever. The t the usage will have a the termin